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NORTH CAROLINA’S REINCARNATED JOINT 
TENANCY: OH INTENT, WHERE ART THOU?* 
DANIEL R. TILLY** & PATRICK K. HETRICK*** 
A mother, her daughter, and her son-in-law received title to a 
North Carolina home as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 
Little did the mother know that she was almost instantly 
destroying the newborn joint tenancy when, in order to finance 
the purchase price, she alone executed a mortgage note and deed 
of trust at the closing. When she died several years later with that 
mortgage loan in default, a legal dispute arose centered on 
whether “severance” of the joint tenancy had occurred. 
Following traditional joint tenancy law theory, the Court of 
Appeals decided somewhat reluctantly that the joint tenancy was 
indeed severed at the very closing during which it was 
successfully created; for by executing the deed of trust, the 
mother had conveyed “title” according to North Carolina’s title 
theory of mortgage law. Under a common law “four unities” 
analysis, her execution of the deed of trust unilaterally destroyed 
the unity of title required for a joint tenancy and automatically 
converted it into a tenancy in common. Contrary to what was 
most likely intended as part of an informal family estate and 
eldercare plan, her fifty percent undivided interest in the home 
remained in her estate at her death and did not pass by 
survivorship to her daughter and son-in-law.1 
This article addresses key real property and public policy issues 
triggered by the 1990 legislative reincarnation of the joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship in North Carolina with a special 
emphasis on creation and severance issues. It also focuses on 
piecemeal statutory amendments and revisions to North Carolina 
joint tenancy law since 1990. The authors’ analysis leads to the 
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 1.  Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 504–07, 725 S.E.2d 
667, 668–69 (2012). 
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following conclusions: First, because joint tenancy creation is 
now intent-based, not unities-based, joint tenancy termination 
should likewise be intent-based, not unities-destruction-based. 
Second, unilateral “stealth” severances of joint tenancies are 
contrary to public policy, unless accompanied by effective prior 
notice to the other joint tenant or tenants. Third, North Carolina 
General Statute section 41-2 requires substantial and 
comprehensive revision to further clarify the contemporary law 
of joint tenancy in North Carolina. Fourth, substantial 
improvement in the law’s transparency is required in the 
legislative process if all interested parties, including consumers, 
are to have a meaningful opportunity to provide input when 
important real property laws are added, revised, or deleted from 
the General Statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until the 2012 Countrywide decision,2 North Carolina 
experienced 228 years with no appellate court decision addressing 
traditional joint tenancy law, including the lightning rod issue of 
severance. Professor John Orth’s article, The Joint Tenancy Makes a 
Comeback in North Carolina,3 chronicles in precise detail the history 
of the joint tenancy in North Carolina, including its legislative 
abolishment in 17844 and return via a revision of North Carolina 
General Statute (“G.S.”) 41-2 effective in 1991.5 While the appellate 
courts decided a handful of cases prior to 1990 recognizing and 
interpreting contracts for survivorship between cotenants,6 the two-
plus century period from 1784 to 1990 is free of traditional joint 
tenancy law issues.7 Another twenty-two years passed after the 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 491 (1991). 
 4. Id. at 493. 
 5. Id. at 491–92. 
 6. Id. at 495–97. Professor Orth discusses three of these interim-period contract 
cases, Vettori v. Fay, 262 N.C. 481, 137 S.E.2d 810 (1964), Pope v. Burgess, 230 N.C. 323, 
53 S.E.2d 159 (1949), and Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895). Orth’s critique 
of Vettori v. Fay provides sound reasons why practicing attorneys today should avoid the 
contract theory option. See Orth, supra note 3, at 496. See infra note 65, for Professor 
Orth’s discussion of the shortcomings of contract-for-survivorship theory. 
 7. Technically the “joint tenancy” continued to exist, but in a form that eliminated 
the survivorship feature. Therefore, with the exception of the “trade and commerce” 
provisions in the original statute, the joint tenancy became indistinguishable from a 
tenancy in common. See SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, MORDECAI’S LAW LECTURES 602 
(1916) (“[A]s far back as 1784, we practically abolished joint tenancy as a beneficial estate 
in fee simple . . . .”). 
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“reincarnation” of the joint tenancy before the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals addressed any issue based on traditional joint tenancy law. 
Countrywide and the unfortunate legislative response to that case 
notwithstanding,8 the North Carolina history—more aptly “non-
history”—of traditional joint tenancy law presents a unique, 
challenging, and wonderful jurisprudential opportunity for both an 
exploration of contemporary joint tenancy theory and a clarification 
of creation and severance issues. Two centuries of North Carolina law 
devoid of precedent provide a “clean slate” for a fresh consideration 
of issues and public policy in a millennium far different from the 
medieval roots of the tenancy’s origin. 
In this article, we first summarize the North Carolina General 
Assembly’s 1991 amendment to the joint tenancy statute, G.S. 41-2, 
and the piecemeal amendments to that statute that followed. We then 
analyze predictable creation and severance issues. Next, we revisit 
Countrywide and what we consider a flawed legislative response to 
that decision. Throughout, we advocate an intent-based analysis of 
creation and severance issues, an approach that revisits an ongoing, 
yet decades-old debate.9 Finally, we compare and contrast the 
approach of other jurisdictions to joint tenancy creation and 
severance. As part of our discussion of joint tenancy legislation, we 
highly recommend the North Carolina General Assembly develop a 
 
 8. See discussion infra Part III. 
 9. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint 
Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1–2 n.1 (1998) (citing and summarizing scholarship from the 
1950s as follows: “See Paul Basye, Joint Tenancy: A Reappraisal, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 504, 507 
(1955) (describing the four unities of joint tenancy as ‘an outstanding example of 
persisting medieval formalism’); Londo H. Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Ownership of 
Real Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 227 (1961) (stating that the four 
unities requirement is ‘outmoded and has no place in modern law’); John Mann, Joint 
Tenancies Today, 1956 ILL. L. F. 48, 75 (describing the joint tenancy as ‘a technical 
common law estate, full of pitfalls for the unwary and uninformed’); Elmer M. Million et 
al., Real and Personal Property, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 357, 381 (1961) (noting with approval 
the development of an intent-based test according to discussions ‘during the past seven 
years’); Frank Reichelderfer, Severance of Joint Interests, 1959 ILL. L. F. 932, 934–35 
(showing need for the use of a straw-man to sever); Robert W. Swenson & Ronan E. 
Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. REV. 466, 503 (1954) (arguing that the 
unities may have had a purpose historically ‘but are useless concepts today’); Leland 
Stuart Beck, Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154, 159 (1955) (‘The intention of the parties should 
be controlling, and the function of the court is to seek out that intention.’); Note, Effect of 
Contract to Sell, 42 IOWA L. REV. 646, 648–49 (1957) (criticizing recent decision as 
contrary to the better rule that would ‘hold intention to be the primary test for severance,’ 
as was true for creation); Edward H. Hoenicke, Comment, Elimination of the Straw Man 
in the Creation of Joint Estates in Michigan, 54 MICH. L. REV. 118, 120 (1955); George W. 
Marti, Note, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1194, 1195 (1957); Harold J. Romig, Jr. & John M. Shelton, 
Comment, Severance of a Joint Tenancy in California, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 290, 298 (1957)”). 
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more deliberative and transparent vetting process prior to the 
addition or revision of any statute having the effect of making 
substantial alterations to the law of real property. 
I.  THE STATUTES 
A. The 1991 Reincarnation of the North Carolina Joint Tenancy 
A brief summary of the key statute and subsequent amendments 
and revisions to statutes dealing with joint tenancy law in North 
Carolina is essential to an understanding of current real property and 
public policy issues. Section (a) of G.S. 41-2, the key statute we will 
focus on throughout this article, reads as follows as revised and 
amended in 1991 and 2009: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided herein, in all estates, real or 
personal, held in joint tenancy, the part or share of any tenant 
dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant, but shall 
descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or administrators, 
respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner as 
estates held by tenancy in common: Provided, that estates held 
in joint tenancy for the purpose of carrying on and promoting 
trade and commerce, or any useful work or manufacture, 
established and pursued with a view of profit to the parties 
therein concerned, are vested in the surviving partner, in order 
to enable the surviving partner to settle and adjust the 
partnership business, or pay off the debts which may have been 
contracted in pursuit of the joint business; but as soon as the 
same is effected, the survivor shall account with, and pay, and 
deliver to the heirs, executors and administrators respectively of 
such deceased partner all such part, share, and sums of money 
as the deceased partner may be entitled to by virtue of the 
original agreement, if any, or according to the deceased 
partner’s share or part in the joint concern, in the same manner 
as partnership stock is usually settled between joint merchants 
and the representatives of their deceased partners. Nothing in 
this section prevents the creation of a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship in real or personal property if the instrument 
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of 
survivorship, and no other document shall be necessary to 
establish said right of survivorship. Upon conveyance to a third 
party by less than all of three or more joint tenants holding 
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in 
common is created among the third party and the remaining joint 
tenants, who remain joint tenants with right of survivorship as 
between themselves. Upon conveyance to a third party by one of 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
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two joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, a tenancy in common is created between the third 
party and the remaining joint tenant. A conveyance of any 
interest in real property by a party to one or more other parties, 
whether or not jointly with the grantor-party, as joint tenants with 
right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the 
instrument of conveyance expressly provides for a joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship.10 
The General Assembly adopted a regrettable drafting approach 
when it reincarnated the joint tenancy with right of survivorship form 
of concurrent ownership. Rather than revising the law with a 
straightforward new statute drafted from scratch, legislators opted for 
an incomplete, confusing patchwork quilt of verbiage, combining a 
colonial weaver’s fragment of woolen cloth with a piece of modern 
spandex. The original language of 1784 was left in place with the 1991 
“reincarnation” language tacked to the end.11 Professor Orth notes 
that:  
The new statute on joint tenancy comes in the form of an 
addition to the current codification of the Act of 1784; that is, 
the general rule adopted two centuries ago remains in force, but 
a further and very broad exception to it is created. The estate of 
joint tenancy is still without the right of survivorship, unless 
“the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly provides 
for a right of survivorship.”12 
In blunt, non-legal terms, however, the methodology employed 
in the 1991 revision might more aptly be termed “duct-tape” drafting. 
Picture a layperson, a first-year law student, or even an attorney with 
limited exposure to real property law, reading this statute for the first 
time. The title to G.S. 41-2 was revised in the reincarnation process to 
read, in part: “Survivorship In Joint Tenancy defined; proviso as to 
Partnership.”13 The first sentence of the 1991 statute continues to 
 
 10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013) (emphasis added). The 2009 legislation 
converted the former statute as amended in 1990 to subsection (a) and added a new 
subsection (b) to the statute. See Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 
427, 428 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a)). 
 11. See Orth, supra note 3, at 497. 
 12. Id. at 497 (citations omitted) (quoting Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 224, 225 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). For a 
transcription of the 1991 revision of G.S. 41-2, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) and supra 
note 10 and accompanying text. Through subsequent amendments, the title to G.S. 41-2 
now reads: “Survivorship in joint tenancy defined; proviso as to partnership; unequal 
ownership interests.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a). 
 13. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 224, 224 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
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declare that a joint tenancy in North Carolina does not have a 
survivorship feature14 but inserts the language “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided herein” at the beginning of that sentence.15 This is followed 
by business entity exceptions. The first sentence of the language 
tacked on to the end of the original statute in the above-quoted 
statute then declares, “[n]othing in this section prevents the creation 
of a joint tenancy in real or personal property if the instrument 
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for survivorship.”16 
Yes, attorney and law student alike will ultimately make sense 
out of the statute, and an astute layperson might also successfully 
decipher it. However, most readers will do so only after journeying 
through ancient language of little utility to perhaps ninety-five 
percent of those seeking guidance on the law of joint tenancy. From 
the vantage point of evaluating the quality of the statute, we find little 
solace in the fact that a careful reader will eventually arrive at the 
relevant sentences tacked to the end by the 1991 revision.17 
In what at best can be considered a lukewarm defense of the 
revision technique engaged in by the General Assembly during the 
1990-91 session, the North Carolina approach to recognizing joint 
tenancies mimics that of other jurisdictions.18 In one popular law 
school hornbook, for example, the authors summarize this trend as 
follows: “In many states there are statutes that do not purport to 
abolish joint tenancies, but which provide in substance that a transfer 
to two or more persons in their own right shall create a tenancy in 
common unless the transferor indicates that the transferees shall take 
as joint tenants.”19 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; see also supra italicized text accompanying note 10. 
 17. A precise and comprehensive legislative history of the 1991 amendment to G.S. 
41-2 is either non-existent or tremendously difficult to obtain. Locating the applicable 
committee minutes involves sifting through thousands of documents located on microfiche 
at the North Carolina Legislative Office Building. A June 6, 1989, memorandum from 
Rep. Giles Perry, a co-sponsor of H.B. 1067 with Rep. S. Thompson, to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee explains that the amendment’s purpose is to “specify that no 
document other than the one creating the joint tenancy is needed to establish a right of 
survivorship, when it expressly provides for such.” Memorandum from Rep. Giles Perry 
(June 6, 1989) (on file with author). 
 18. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.3 
(3d ed. 2000) (citing various state statutes, including: “Ark. Stat. § 50-411; Md. Code Real 
Property, § 2-117; 60 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 74; Official Code Ga. Ann. § 85-1002; Mass. Gen. 
L. Ann. Ch. 184 § 7 (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-501; Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5202.20, 5302.17; 
Va. Code 1950, §§ 55-20, 55-21”). 
 19. Id. § 5.3, at 185. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
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By this point, the reader is probably thinking: “Tell me what you 
really think about the 1991 revision to G.S. 41-2.” But the familiar 
sales pitch in late-night commercials—“but wait, there’s more”—is 
our best response, for even the title utilized in the 1991 revision is an 
incomplete and, in part, a misleading patch job. The language 
preceding the proviso as to partnership property was changed from 
“Survivorship In Joint Tenancy Abolished” to “Survivorship In Joint 
Tenancy Defined.”20 This title simply does not accurately disclose a 
significant reform of the North Carolina law of concurrent ownership. 
B. Elimination of Three of the Four Common Law Unities 
A series of helpful post-1991 amendments to G.S. 41-2 
transformed the traditional joint tenancy into conformity with 
contemporary law and practice of many jurisdictions. As the 
legislative dust settles, three of the four traditional joint tenancy 
unities are no longer required for creation, leaving only unity of 
possession remaining as an attribute of the joint tenancy. The 
continuing requirement of unity of possession is an insignificant one. 
This is the case because, under traditional joint tenancy law, actual 
possession by each joint tenant is not required,21 and joint tenants 
have always enjoyed the flexibility to modify rights of possession and 
use without jeopardizing the unity of possession requirement.22 
The unities of time and title, common law requirements that the 
joint tenancy be created at the same time and by the same 
instrument,23 were eliminated effective July 10, 2009,24 leaving straw-
men and straw-women unemployed throughout the state.25 The 
 
 20. Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 224, 224 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). 
 21. See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 274 n.2 (4th ed. 2005) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*180). 
 22. See, e.g., Hammond v. McArthur, 183 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1947) (noting that joint 
tenants are able to modify the right of equal possession and use, but these modifications 
are not inconsistent with unity of possession). Some jurisdictions have eliminated all four 
unities. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.19(3) (West 2014) (“The common law 
requirement for unity of time, title, interest, and possession for the creation of a joint 
tenancy is abolished.”). 
 23. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 183. 
 24. See Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 427, 428 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013)). The elimination of the need for a 
“strawperson” fulfilled Professor Orth’s final suggestion in his article. See Orth, supra note 
3, at 500. 
 25. G.S. 41-2, however, does not expressly deal with whether severance of a joint 
tenancy can take place by execution of a deed by a grantor-joint tenant to herself as a 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
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amendment included a curative provision saving conveyances prior to 
its enactment that had not followed the proper straw-conveyance 
procedure.26 Unity of interest was also jettisoned in 2009;27 G.S. 41-
2(b) now reads, in part: 
(b) The interests of the grantees holding property in joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship shall be deemed to be equal 
unless otherwise specified in the conveyance. Any joint tenancy 
interest held by a husband and wife, unless otherwise specified, 
shall be deemed to be held as a single tenancy by the entirety, 
which shall be treated as a single party when determining 
interests in the joint tenancy with right of survivorship. If joint 
tenancy interests among three or more joint tenants holding 
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship are held in 
unequal shares, upon the death of one joint tenant, the share of 
the deceased joint tenant shall be divided among the surviving 
joint tenants according to their respective pro rata interest and 
not equally, unless the creating instrument provides otherwise.28 
As with the prior amendment eliminating the unities of time and 
title, the elimination of unity of interest included a necessary curative 
provision.29 Inquiries to Professor Hetrick prior to the amendment of 
 
tenant in common. See infra text accompanying notes 106–13, dealing with whether 
unilateral severance by one joint tenant is effective by a direct conveyance to herself. 
 26. The last sentence of G.S. 41-2(a) was amended in 1991 to read: “A conveyance of 
any interest in real property by a party to himself and one or more other parties, as joint 
tenants with right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the instrument of 
conveyance expressly provides for a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.” Act of July 
9, 1991, ch. 606, § 1, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1338, 1338 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). Gender-neutral changes were made to the last sentence of subsection 
(a) in 2009, and that sentence now reads: “A conveyance of any interest in real property 
by a party to one or more other parties, whether or not jointly with the grantor-party, as 
joint tenants with right of survivorship, creates in the parties that interest, if the instrument 
of conveyance expressly provides for survivorship.” Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 
N.C. Sess. Laws 427, 428 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013)). 
 27. Act of July 10, 2009, ch. 268, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 427 (titled “An Act To 
Clarify That Interests In A Joint Tenancy With A Right Of Survivorship May Be Held In 
Unequal Shares”). In reality, this legislation reflects a major substantive change to the law 
of joint tenancy, not a mere clarification. 
 28. Id. The title to G.S. 41-2 now reads: “Survivorship in joint tenancy defined; 
proviso as to partnership; unequal ownership interests.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013). 
 29. The last paragraph of G.S. 41-2(b) now reads: 
This subsection shall apply to any conveyance of an interest in property created at 
any time that explicitly sought to create unequal ownership interests in a joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship. Distributions made prior to the enactment of 
this subsection that were made in equal amounts from a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship that sought to create unequal ownership shares shall remain valid and 
shall not be subject to modification on the basis of this section. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
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G.S. 41-2 to eliminate the unity of interest requirement reveal that 
attorneys were considering the creation of joint tenancies with 
unequal interests to serve the practical needs of their clients.30 A 
classic principle of statutory construction dictates that the express 
earlier elimination of two unities—time and title—left the remaining 
common law unities of interest and possession in place.31 As with the 
earlier amendment eliminating time and title, the amendment’s 
retroactive “cure” was deemed necessary due to the perceived needs 
of clients and the erroneous assumption among some members of the 
bar that a joint tenancy could be legally created in North Carolina 
with unequal interests. In any event, the takeaway is a very positive 
one: the amendment eliminating unity of interest provides client-
centered flexibility to the law of joint tenancy.32 
In 2012, additional amendments became necessary to correct an 
oversight in the revision of G.S. 41-2 that ignored the ripple effect of 
recognizing unequal ownership interests in joint tenancies on the 
Simultaneous Death Act.33 Last but not least, the General Assembly 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(b). 
 30. During 2007 and 2008, Professor Hetrick received numerous phone calls from 
attorneys describing fact situations in which deeds creating joint tenancies with unequal 
interests were being considered. 
 31. By omitting only the unities of time and title, the General Assembly left the 
remaining unities of interest and possession in place, invoking the doctrine of expessio 
unius est exclusio alterius. See, e.g., Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 779–80, 430 S.E.2d 244, 
247 (1993) (“Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, when a statute 
lists the situations to which it applies, it implies the exclusion of situations not contained in 
the list.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Routhier v. Twp. of Clark, No. 450599, 2014 WL 2781729, at *1–2 (Mich. 
Tax Trib. May 6, 2014) (discussing a property tax dispute in which the grantor had 
conveyed by quitclaim deed a one percent interest to his son and a ninety-nine percent 
interest to himself, “all parties as joint tenant with full rights of survivorship”). Other 
jurisdictions cling to the “unity of interest” requirement. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 
P.3d 984, 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that same-sex domestic partners owned 
property as tenants in common rather than as joint tenants where unity of interest was 
lacking). 
 33. See Act of Oct. 1, 2012, ch. 69, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 230 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-3 (2013)). The necessary revision eliminated the prior rule under the 
Simultaneous Death Act that property passed in the event of a simultaneous death “[to] 
each of the co-owners in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of co-
owners,”Act of June 27, 2007, ch. 132, § 1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 222–223 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-3 (2013)), and replaced it with the following: 
Except as otherwise provided in this Article: 
(1) If there are two or more co-owners with right of survivorship and it is not 
established by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of them survived the 
other or others by at least 120 hours, then, unless the governing instrument 
provides otherwise, each co-owner’s pro rata interest in the property passes as if 
that co-owner had survived all other co-owners by at least 120 hours. 
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effectively reversed the court of appeals decision in Countrywide “and 
more” effective July 1, 2013, by adding subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2.34 
Throughout this article, we presume that a North Carolina joint 
tenancy is now an intent-based form of concurrent ownership. Both 
Professor Orth35 and other leading real property experts36 opine that 
the emphasis in statutory interpretation should be on language 
sufficient to indicate an intent to create a joint tenancy. While three 
of the four traditional common law unities are no longer necessary, 
some or all will likely continue to be present in many conveyances. 
The continued existence of unities, however, should not preclude an 
intent-based framework of analysis on both creation and severance 
issues.37 In short, the archaic common law focus on unities is 
inconsistent with contemporary joint tenancy jurisprudence. 
Historically, unities-based theories of creation and severance tended 
to be intent defeating, too often a trap for laypersons and attorneys 
alike. Indeed, we propose that even the continuing use of the word 
“severance” is inaccurate; instead, the term “termination” more 
precisely conveys the idea that one joint tenant either expressly or 
impliedly intends to end the joint tenancy with its survivorship feature 
and convert it into a tenancy in common. We will, however, continue 
to use the term “severance” because so many appellate courts 
uniformly do so. 
 
(2) If there are two or more co-owners with right of survivorship and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of them survived the 
other or others by at least 120 hours, then, unless the governing instrument 
provides otherwise, the pro rata interest or interests of the deceased owner or 
owners who are not established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived 
by at least 120 hours passes to (i) the remaining owner if only one or (ii) if more 
than one, then to those remaining owners according to the pro rata interest of 
each. 
Act of Oct. 1, 2012, ch. 69, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 230 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 28A-24-3 (2013)). 
 34. See Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 204, § 1.11, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 577 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013)) (discussed infra Section III.A). 
 35. See Orth, supra note 3, at 498 (“[R]eliance must be placed on courts interpreting 
the statute to recognize that what must be express is the intention to create the right of 
survivorship, not some set verbal formula.”). 
 36. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 185 (“Even where the 
statutory language is rather restrictive, it is generally unnecessary to use the exact words 
contained in the statute in order to indicate the intent to create a joint tenancy.”). 
 37. Compare Helmholz, supra note 9, at 1–2 n.1, with prior articles summarized 
therein. The tension between formalism and intent in joint tenancy law deserves 
reexamination in light of the relatively recent elimination of three of the four unities in 
North Carolina and many other jurisdictions. 
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One relic of colonial American property law particularly 
deserving of the jurisprudential dumpster is the categorization of joint 
tenancy as an “odious” form of concurrent ownership.38 While the 
tenancy in common remains the safe, default category of concurrent 
ownership—absent a clear intent to the contrary—the joint tenancy is 
far from “odious,”39 and instead, enjoys considerable contemporary 
utilitarian value as a flexible method of creating a survivorship 
feature.40 While the original common law rule favoring joint tenancies 
ended with feudalism, and the colonial distaste for joint tenancies was 
understandably based on their medieval role in preserving aristocratic 
forms of land ownership,41 no compelling modern rationale exists for 
an appellate court to bend over backwards to avoid finding a joint 
tenancy. All that should be necessary today is clear intent to create a 
joint tenancy regardless of the particular verbiage employed. 
C. Shortcomings of the Revised North Carolina Joint Tenancy 
Statutes 
Two overarching issues—creation and severance—dominate 
joint tenancy controversies in other jurisdictions. Because joint 
tenancies will continue to be created by a few words in a conveyance 
or devise,42 the outcome of most foreseeable issues will be determined 
 
 38. See, e.g., Blodogett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 149 A. 790, 793 (Conn. 
1930) (“Our own court from an early day has looked with disfavor upon the common law 
joint tenancy with its ‘odious and unjust doctrine of survivorship.’ But that has not 
prevented our recognition of the right in this jurisdiction to create estates of this nature by 
will, or deed, or other instrument, when the intention to so create is clear and definite.”); 
Davidson v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459, 460 (Pa. 1799); Galbraith v. Galbraith, 3 Serg. & 
Rawle 392, 393 (Pa. 1817) (explaining that the tenancy in common is favored because “a 
joint-tenancy is odious; and the principles of the feudal system from which it originated 
are foreign to the feelings and civil institutions of Pennsylvania”); Fawver v. Fawver, 47 
Va. (6 Gratt.) 236 (Va. 1849). 
 39. The Oxford Dictionary defines “odious” as “extremely unpleasant; repulsive.” 
Odius, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american 
_english/odious (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 40. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, PROPERTY LAW § 10.02 [B][4], at 134 (3d ed. 2007) 
(noting that the joint tenancy has been extensively used in recent years as a tool to avoid 
the cost and delay of probate proceedings). 
 41. Statutes ending the common law presumption of a joint tenancy enacted soon 
after the American Revolution were based on identification of the joint tenancy as a 
remnant of feudalism. See 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 424, at 206 n.47 
(B. Jones ed., 3d ed. 1939). 
 42. See, e.g., John W. Fisher, II, Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien After 
Death?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 637, 638 (1997) (noting that because co-tenancies are created 
by a few words in a conveyance or devise, “the legal relationship between cotenants is 
determined from the common law court decisions and statutory provisions and not the 
language of the creating instrument”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
2015] JOINT TENANCY IN NORTH CAROLINA. 1661 
by appellate court decisions without statutory guidance. Concerning 
creation and severance issues, the 1991 and subsequent amendments 
to G.S. 41-2 are helpful but incomplete. In the following subsections 
of this article, we transition from a general analysis of G.S. 41-2 to an 
examination and critique of predictable joint tenancy creation and 
severance issues. 
1.  Predictable Creation Issues 
G.S. 41-2 addresses creation of a joint tenancy as follows: 
“Nothing in this section prevents the creation of a joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship in real or personal property if the instrument 
creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of 
survivorship, and no other document shall be necessary to establish 
said right of survivorship.”43 
Examples of predictable creation language: 
 
Example 1. O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants with right 
of survivorship.” Clearly, this precise language creates a joint tenancy 
under the above-quoted statutory language. Experienced real estate 
attorneys will cling to this simple formula for success. 
Example 2. O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants and not as 
tenants in common.” Historically, lawyers in other jurisdictions might 
adopt this language to create a joint tenancy. Professor Orth opines 
that this language will pass muster,44 and we concur. By eliminating 
the tenancy in common, the only form of concurrent ownership 
without a survivorship feature, the language indirectly, but expressly, 
provides for survivorship.45 While no North Carolina appellate court 
 
 43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a) (2013). 
 44. Orth, supra note 3, at 498 (“A carefully drafted instrument will closely follow the 
words of the statute, describing the grantees as holding ‘as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship,’ or even ‘as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in 
common.’ Such wording would undoubtedly accomplish its purpose. But not all drafting is 
equally careful: the right of a survivor may be referred to without expressly using the 
phrase ‘right of survivorship.’ In Vettori, for example, where a right of survivorship was 
found to have been created by contract, those specific words were not used. The grantees 
were described as only holding ‘as joint tenants’ and reference was made as well to ‘the 
heirs and assigns of the survivor.’ Reliance must be placed on courts interpreting the 
statute to recognize that what must be expressed is the intention to create the right of 
survivorship, not some set verbal formula.”). 
 45. See infra Example 8 where the possibility of a “tenancy in common with right of 
survivorship” is discussed. The traditional tenancy in common, however, has no right of 
survivorship. 
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has interpreted this language, other jurisdictions appropriately reach 
the joint tenancy result.46 
Example 3. O conveys “to A & B as joint tenants.” Without 
a doubt, this language, standing alone, will unfortunately occur, 
particularly when laypersons surf the web for guidance on do-it-
yourself drafting of important legal documents. Absent other 
language in the conveyance, the current joint tenancy creation 
requirements of G.S. 41-2 are not precisely satisfied. At a minimum, 
this incomplete language will likely result in a dispute and possible 
litigation on the creation issue.47 
Example 4. O conveys “to A & B jointly with right of 
survivorship.” Used in isolation, the word “jointly” has always been 
suspect because the joint tenancy form of concurrent ownership is 
traditionally not favored.48 In this example, however, the word 
“jointly” is not used in isolation, and the addition of the words “with 
right of survivorship” should be sufficient to create a joint tenancy in 
North Carolina. The language might validly be selected because it 
appears in other North Carolina statutes.49 G.S. 30-3.2(3f)(c) equates 
the term “jointly with right of survivorship” with “joint tenants with 
right of survivorship,” appearing to use the former term as a generic 
version of the latter. The sub-subsection reads as follows: 
Property held as tenants by the entirety or jointly with right of 
survivorship as follows: 
 
 46. See, e.g., 4 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY § 1775, at 10 (Replacement Vol. 1979) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON 
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY] (citing two Illinois Supreme Court decisions, 
Dolley v. Powers, 89 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1949) and Klouda v. Pechousek, 110 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 
1953)). 
 47. The possibility of reformation, of course, exists, although any language that results 
in what can be costly litigation is per se inadequate. However, beware of those inevitable 
deed interpretation disputes where additional, arguably contradictory language is added. 
See, e.g., Spresser v. Langmade, 427 P.2d 478, 480 (Kan. 1967) (describing grantees in the 
introductory clause of a deed as “joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as 
tenants in common,” but the granting and habendum clauses included the language “unto 
said parties of the second part, their heirs, successors and assigns, forever”). The Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s conclusion that a tenancy in common was created 
and found that the “clearest type of language” was used to show an intent to create a joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship. Id. 
 48. See COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, 
§ 1775, at 11–12. 
 49. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(3f)(b) (2013). The “definitions” section of 
Article 1A, “Elective Share,” reads, in part, as follows: “Property over which the 
decedent, immediately before death, held a presently exercisable general power of 
appointment, except for (i) property held jointly with right of survivorship which is 
includable in total assets only to the extent provided in sub-subdivision c. of this 
subdivision . . . .”Id. (emphasis added). 
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1. One-half of any property held by the decedent and the 
surviving spouse as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants 
with right of survivorship is included, without regard to who 
contributed the property. 
2. Property held by the decedent and one or more other persons 
other than the surviving spouse as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship is included to the following extent: 
I. All property attributable to the decedent’s contribution. 
II. The decedent’s pro rata share of property not attributable to 
the decedent’s contribution, except to the extent of property 
attributable to contributions by a surviving joint tenant. 
The decedent is presumed to have contributed the jointly 
owned property unless contribution by another is proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.50 
It is clear that the “property held” language in the introduction 
of the sub-subsection is referring to real property, and the language 
“jointly with right of survivorship” is used interchangeably with the 
language “joint tenants with right of survivorship.” 
A potential dispute could involve a conveyance to a third person 
by one party intending to sever the purported joint tenancy, with the 
other party asserting that joint life estates with a contingent 
remainder to the survivor were created, not a true joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship. 
Example 5. O conveys “to A & B for their joint lives with 
right of survivorship.”51 Does this language create a joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship, or a materially different combination of present 
estates for life with contingent remainder in fee simple absolute to the 
survivor? The label we place on this conveyance matters under both 
the law of partition and severance. While a joint life estate can be 
partitioned,52 the contingent remainders are indestructible and not 
subject to partition absent an agreement by both A & B.53 Although a 
deed of trust executed by only A or B will convey both the grantor’s 
 
 50. Id.  
 51. If the intention of the grantor is to create joint life estates with contingent 
remainder to the survivor, use of the term “contingent remainder” will reinforce the fact 
that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is not intended. Perhaps this is overkill, but 
to remove all doubt, a statement in the conveyance as follows will suffice: “It is not the 
grantor’s intent in this conveyance to create a joint tenancy.” 
 52. Ray v. Poole, 187 N.C. 749, 752, 123 S.E. 5, 6–7 (1924). 
 53. Id. at 752, 123 S.E. at 6; see also COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, § 1775, at 13 (noting that life estates with cross 
remainders “cannot be defeated by deed or will of one of the life co-tenants”). 
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joint life estate and contingent remainder, it will not survive the death 
of a predeceasing mortgagor. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative response to 
Countrywide, is clearly inapplicable.54 
Example 6.  O conveys “to A & B with right of 
survivorship.” This inadequate language is neither fish nor fowl. It 
expressly provides for survivorship without using the important words 
“as joint tenants,” and alludes to a possible future interest without 
using the words “remainder” or “contingent remainder.” Without 
more, the words appear to point to a joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, the closest form of concurrent ownership that fulfills the 
grantor’s probable intent.55 This is the case because a fee simple is 
presumed and the words “life estate” or “joint lives” are absent. In 
addition, it would be inappropriate for a court to overemphasize the 
modern preference for a tenancy in common in a fact situation where 
the grantor clearly intended a survivorship feature. 
Example 7. O conveys “to A & B jointly.” One leading 
treatise reaffirms the traditional preference for the tenancy in 
common default rule56 while one contemporary hornbook author 
opines that this language “may be insufficient” to create a joint 
tenancy.57 As with many of these creation examples, the words 
featured often occur with other language. The word “jointly,” for 
example, is sometimes combined with “jointly and severally,” 
compounding the confusion.58 
Example 8. O conveys “to A & B as tenants in common 
with right of survivorship.” Oh, the web we spin! This language may 
 
 54. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative response to Countrywide, is strictly limited to the 
“joint tenancy” form of real property ownership. Specifically, it deals with the issue of 
whether a deed of trust executed by a joint tenant “severs” the joint tenancy. A 
conveyance “to A & B for their joint lives with right of survivorship” is not a joint tenancy; 
rather, it is a combination of present and future interests in real property. Therefore, any 
issue of “severance” of a joint tenancy is completely inapplicable. 
 55. G.S. 30-3.2(3f)(c), discussed with Example 4, supra, also lends credence to this 
interpretation. See also COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 
supra note 46, § 1775, at 11 n.15 (“Conveyance to A and B and their heirs with right of 
survivorship did not militate against a joint tenancy since heirs were words of limitation.”) 
(citing Spresser v. Langmade, 427 P.2d 478, 480 (Kan. 1967) (holding a conveyance “to A 
& B and their heirs with right of survivorship did not militate against a joint tenancy since 
heirs were words of limitation”). 
 56. See COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, 
§ 1775, at 13 (citing In re Ungara’s Estate, 51 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), 
superseded by statute, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2 (McKinney 1998) 
(“jointly” does not overcome the statutory presumption of a tenancy in common)). 
 57. See SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.02[2], at 133. 
 58. See id. (citing James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a 
tenancy in common)). 
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effectively create a right of survivorship, but what title do we place on 
this conveyance? After all, the hallmark of a common law tenancy in 
common is the lack of a right of survivorship.59 Stoebuck and 
Whitman summarize the law, in part, as follows: 
Although survivorship is not an incident of tenancies in 
common, many cases assert that the right of survivorship may 
be annexed to a tenancy in common if the instrument creating 
the tenancy in common so provides. This means, apparently, 
that an instrument containing an express provision for 
survivorship will be held to create a tenancy in common for the 
lives of the cotenants, with a contingent remainder (usually in 
fee simple) in favor of the surviving cotenant.60 
Thompson on Property, the venerable treatise on real property 
law, explains that “[i]n a tenancy in common with right of 
survivorship, the survivor takes by virtue of the contract created by 
the express language of the instrument . . . .”61 The author adds that 
survivorship “arises by virtue of the agreement of the parties and not 
as an incident of the property law.”62 
The Thompson treatise goes on to explain that use of this form of 
conveyance is attributed to “a counter current endeavoring to revive 
the survivorship result” in jurisdictions that prohibited the tenancy by 
the entireties and joint tenancy.63 The explanation fits those 
intervening North Carolina appellate court decisions recognizing and 
enforcing contracts for survivorship between cotenants,64 although 
Professor Orth understandably sees contract theory as both raising 
 
 59. Id. § 10.02[1], at 131. (“Tenants in common do not have a right of survivorship, 
unlike joint tenants or tenants by the entirety.”). 
 60. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.2, at 180 (citing Pope v. Burgess, 230 
N.C. 323, 325, 53 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1949) and COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, § 1793, at 140 n.36, § 1796, at 149 (including section 1796 
of COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, which is titled “Tenancy 
in common with right of survivorship”)). 
 61. COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 46, 
§ 1796, at 149. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 1796, at 148; see also id. § 1775, at 13 n.24 (citing Halleck v. Halleck, 337 P.2d 
330 (Or. 1959) (recognizing the use of a joint tenancy in Oregon at a time when a joint 
tenancy could not be created and holding that “a tenancy in common with right of 
survivorship can be created through the medium of increment life estates with cross 
indestructible remainders”)). 
 64. See Orth, supra note 3, at 495–97 (discussing the three North Carolina contract 
cases Taylor v. Smith, Vettori v. Fay, and Pope v. Burgess). 
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“several disturbing questions” and being inconsistently applied by the 
courts.65 
Current use of the language “to A & B as tenants in common 
with right of survivorship,” however, can predictably produce 
confusion now that North Carolina recognizes the joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship. Does this language now create nothing but a 
joint tenancy in tenancy-in-common clothing? Or, does it result in a 
contract for survivorship that eliminates the possibility of unilateral 
severance by one cotenant? Had this language been utilized in 
Countrywide, what result?66 
Example 9. O conveys to unmarried grantees “as tenants by the 
entirety.” Does this transfer create a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the 
entirety? In a recent Indiana appellate court decision, for example, a 
father conveyed real property to his two sons “as tenants by the 
entireties.”67 When one son predeceased the other, his estate 
commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the 
sons held title as tenants in common. The Indiana Court of Appeals 
held that the grantor’s use of the term “tenants by the entirety” 
evidenced a sufficient intent to convey a right of survivorship.68 While 
a conveyance to two brothers as tenants by the entirety will hopefully 
be a rare fact situation, conveyances to purportedly married couples 
who, in fact, are not legally married are predictable.69 
 
 65. Id. at 496–97 (noting that worries about the enforceability of contracts for 
survivorship may have been one of the reasons for passage of the statute recognizing 
traditional joint tenancies). 
 66. These are matters reserved for our discussion of “severance.” See infra Section 
IV.B. As a bit of dramatic foreshadowing, however, we ask: Is G.S. 41-2(a1), dealing with 
a deed of trust executed by one “joint tenant,” applicable at all to a “tenancy in common 
with right of survivorship?” 
 67. Powell v. Powell, 14 N.E.3d 46, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The deed was drafted by 
the grantor’s legal counsel. Id. at 50. 
 68. Id. The relevant statute presumes a tenancy in common unless “the intent to 
create an estate in joint tenancy manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument.” Id. 
at 48 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 32-17-2-1(c) (West 2014)). 
 69. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Indiana cites the following cases from 
other jurisdictions as having addressed similar situations where a conveyance to unmarried 
couples as “tenants by the entirety” results in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship: 
Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 99–102 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (conveyance to putative 
husband and wife as “tenants by the entirety” creates a joint tenancy); Wood v. Wood, 571 
S.W.2d 84, 85–86 (Ark. 1978) (conveyance to a putative husband and wife as “tenants by 
the entirety” where the husband was already married to another results in a joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship); Sams v. McDonald, 160 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) 
(membership in a savings and loan association granted as tenants by the entireties results 
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Powell v. Powell, 14 N.E.3d 46, 50–51 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2014); Morris v. McCarty, 32 N.E. 938, 938–39 (Mass. 1893) (conveyance to putative 
husband and wife as “tenants by the entirety, and not as tenants in common” results in a 
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Example 10. Conveyances to married same-sex couples. Consider 
the following examples of conveyances to a same-sex married couple. 
O conveys: 
a) “to A & B.” 
b) “to A & B as tenants by the entirety.” 
c) “to A & B, a married couple.” 
Prior to the recognition of the right of same-sex couples to 
legally marry in the June 15, 2015, landmark United States Supreme 
Court decision of Obergefell v. Hodges70 and the Bostic v. Schaefer71 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
Example 10 a) clearly results in a tenancy in common; Example 10 b) 
raises the same issues discussed in Example 9, above, and; Example 
10 c) results in a tenancy in common. By both case law72 and statute,73 
a conveyance or devise of real property in North Carolina “to a 
husband and wife” creates a tenancy by the entirety absent clear 
intent to the contrary. Following the recognition of same-sex 
marriages in North Carolina, the result should be the creation of a 
tenancy by the entirety under the same circumstances; if same-sex 
married partners do not enjoy property rights equal to opposite-sex 
married partners, serious constitutional issues are triggered.74 
 
joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Mitchell v. Frederick, 170 A. 733, 734–37 (Md. 
1934) (conveyance to putative husband and wife in an invalid second marriage “by the 
entirety” results in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship); and McManus v. Summers, 
430 A.2d 80, 81–84, 87 (Md. 1981) (conveyance to a couple as “tenants by the entirety” 
created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship assuming that the husband’s divorce 
from his first wife was not valid).  
 70. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (stating that the right to marry is a fundamental one 
and that same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right and liberty under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 71. 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding the right of same-sex couples to marry as 
a fundamental human right protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 72. See, e.g., Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 181, 171 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1970) (“A 
title conveying real estate to a husband and his wife, nothing else appearing, creates an 
estate by the entireties.”). 
 73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (2013) (“A conveyance of real property, or any 
interest therein, to a husband and wife vests title in them as tenants by the entirety when 
the conveyance is to: (1) A named man ‘and wife,’ or (2) A named woman ‘and husband,’ 
or (3) Two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband and 
wife, if at the time of the conveyance they are legally married; unless a contrary intention 
is expressed in the conveyance.”). 
 74. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in 
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their 
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”). See, e.g., State v. 
Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 669 (Alaska 2014) (holding that a property tax exemption program 
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Therefore, the recognition of same-sex marriages requires an 
extensive review and revision of all General Statutes dealing with 
tenancies by the entirety. As of this writing, they are not gender-
neutral. Prompt revisions to these statutes are crucial to accord same-
sex couples all traditional benefits of the tenancy by the entirety.75 
We conclude, with all due deference to the drafters of the 1991 
statutory language, that the effort to bring the traditional joint 
tenancy out of moth balls after two centuries was both cursory and 
incomplete. Of course, skilled real estate practitioners know how to 
create a joint tenancy; laypersons relying on web-based information 
and less-skilled lawyers—if other jurisdictions are any indication—fall 
short on regular occasions. We will recommend that, in light of 
contemporary public policies we will detail later in this article, a more 
complete, precise, and clear statute be enacted to replace G.S. 41-2.  
2.  Predictable Severance Issues 
As most law school graduates will recall from their first-year 
property law course, “severance” is a frequent and troublesome issue 
in joint tenancy law. Curiously, one of the pieces of guidance 
provided by the 1991 version of G.S. 41-2—what is known in 
academic circles as “severance pro tanto”—provides guidance on an 
area where the law in all jurisdictions is clear.76 In relevant part, the 
statute provides: 
Upon conveyance to a third party by less than all of three or 
more joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with right 
of survivorship, a tenancy in common is created among the 
third party and the remaining joint tenants, who remain joint 
tenants with right of survivorship as between themselves. Upon 
conveyance to a third party by one of two joint tenants holding 
property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in 
common is created between the third party and the remaining 
joint tenant.77 
 
violates the Equal Protection Clause where it facially discriminates between same-sex and 
opposite-sex married couples). 
 75. By the date of publication of this article, our hope is that key statutes will be 
revised as we suggest. A full discussion of this issue and the need of urgent statutory 
reform is beyond the scope of this article. 
 76. See Marci v. Swiers, 905 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding joint 
tenant’s conveyance of his one-third interest to his brother vested the brother with a one-
third interest as tenant in common with the remaining two joint tenants who continued to 
hold the two-third undivided interest as joint tenants). 
 77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013).  
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Despite the likelihood of future legal disputes over severance, 
the 1991 version of the statute and later iterations unfortunately 
sidestep potential severance scenarios. As a practical matter, 
additional revisions to G.S. 41-2 therefore remain necessary to guide 
attorneys and laypersons alike on foreseeable future severance issues. 
At the same time, some predictable severance issues present close 
questions of intent and are therefore better anticipated by effective, 
preventive legal planning and drafting. Below, we discuss our views 
on the appropriateness of a legislative or preventive legal approach to 
likely severance controversies. We also consider whether an intent-
based or traditional unities-based approach to severance (termination 
of the survivorship feature of a joint tenancy) best serves public policy 
and practical considerations of preventive law. Most basic law school 
hornbooks and appellate cases summarize predictable severance 
issues as follows: 
a) Whether a lease by one joint tenant severs. This issue has been 
aptly described as “like a comet in our law: though its existence in 
theory has been frequently recognized, its observed passages are 
few.”78 Stoebuck and Whitman observe: 
[O]ne joint tenant may, of course, lease his own undivided 
interest. Whether such a lease will effect a severance has, 
however, been a subject of controversy since the time of 
Littleton and Coke. . . . In the United States there is little 
authority on the point, and two fairly recent cases reached 
opposite results as to the effect of a lease given by one joint 
tenant. In the case holding that such a lease does not sever the 
joint tenancy, the death of the lessor during the lease term 
necessarily terminated the lease and gave the surviving joint 
tenant the immediate right to possession.79 
 
 78. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334–35 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 79. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190. The two case notes by Stoebuck 
and Whitman were Tenhet v. Boswell and Alexander v. Boyer. In Tenhet, the court found 
“neither temporary nor permanent severance; when [the] lessor died, [the] lease 
terminated and lessee’s interest also terminated.” Id.; see also Tenhet, 554 P.2d at 332. The 
court in Alexander found “joint tenancy [was] severed.” STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra 
note 18, at 190; see also Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1969); JOSEPH 
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 352–53 (3d ed. 2010) (citing 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 51.04[1][b], at 51-20 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) 
(summarizing Tenhet, including the arguments both in favor of severing the joint tenancy 
and also for keeping the joint tenancy, while stating the approach in Tenhet appears to be 
the modern trend in most jurisdictions when faced with the question)); SPRANKLING, 
supra note 40, § 10.04[A][2], at 144–45 (concurring that the issue has rarely been addressed 
by any courts in the United States, but arguing that jurisdictions seem roughly equally split 
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While an intent-based approach to severance is more in line with 
contemporary thinking than a unities-based approach, it is still of 
little help in analyzing this issue. The answer is best left to preventive 
law in lease drafting under these circumstances: First, will this transfer 
by one joint tenant be a prudent one? Second, assuming the joint 
tenant nonetheless desires to lease only his or her interest, does that 
joint tenant intend to terminate the survivorship feature of the joint 
tenancy by executing the lease? If the answer to the second question 
is affirmative, then a provision in the lease precisely setting forth the 
intent of the grantor should be sufficient.80 While a lease by one joint 
tenant may or may not sever a joint tenancy, a purported lease of the 
entire fee simple estate by one—without joinder or ratification by the 
others—is completely ineffective to give the lessee exclusive right of 
possession and transfers only the lessor’s undivided interest. Another 
possibility, of course, is the execution of a lease by all joint tenants. 
Our next example addresses that scenario. 
b) Whether a lease given by all joint tenants severs. Based on clear 
landlord and tenant law, the survivorship interests of all joint tenants 
remain subject to the lease upon the death of one joint tenant; i.e., a 
valid lease for a definite period of time, traditionally called a “tenancy 
for years,” survives the death of a lessor. The existence of two or 
more concurrent owners who have executed a lease does not alter 
that result. 
Calling this scenario a “severance pro tanto” may be an accurate 
description. However, bypassing the severance issue entirely and 
instead applying both common sense and traditional landlord and 
tenant law provides a better framework for analysis. If all joint 
tenants execute a lease, it might be prudent once again for their 
attorney to address the potential severance issue and insert a 
provision in the lease either severing or not severing the joint tenancy 
(subject to the lease term in either event). An intent-based approach 
to addressing the joint tenancy implications of this lease should honor 
a clear statement of intent on this issue in the lease. 
c) Whether a conveyance by one joint tenant of his or her interest 
for the life of the transferee severs. Reported decisions are scarce, but 
 
between following the Tenhet approach and an approach that views the granting of a lease 
interest as effectually destroying the unity of interest). 
 80. For the attorney who is unsure concerning this approach, the old-fashioned 
“straw” conveyance to a third party and back again prior to the lease will clearly sever. 
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one approach relying on the traditional unities-based theory of 
severance concludes that a severance pro tanto has occurred.81 
While the growing trend in other jurisdictions is application of an 
intent-based analysis to traditional severance issues,82 that approach, 
absent more facts or specific language in the conveyance, produces a 
result as unclear as that of a severance-based analysis. 
d) Whether a contract to convey by one joint tenant severs during 
the executory period prior to the closing. A consummated real estate 
sales transaction, of course, severs a joint tenancy. But what happens 
when only one joint tenant contracts to convey his or her interest and 
then dies prior to the closing date? If a severance has occurred, then 
the purchase price should be distributed pro rata according to each 
tenant in common’s interest; if not, then the surviving joint tenant or 
tenants enjoy all of the purchase price, and the heirs or devisees of 
the deceased vendor joint tenant receive nothing. 
The traditional approach to this issue is steeped in both a 
destruction-of-unities analysis combined with the still viable common 
law doctrine of equitable conversion. Upon the execution of a 
specifically enforceable contract to convey his or her interest, the 
joint tenant is transferring equitable title to the vendee and retaining 
only bare legal title representing the right to receive the contract 
price. Therefore, the conveyance of equitable title has been 
traditionally considered a “severance” for joint tenancy law 
purposes.83 As with the discussion of leases supra, an intent-based 
 
 81. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190 (citing Hammond v. McArthur, 
183 P.2d 1, 2–3 (Cal. 1947); Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73, 75–76 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1936)) (“[I]f any of the joint tenants dies during the continuance of the life estate 
conveyed, there is no immediate right of survivorship; but upon termination of the life 
estate the joint tenancy revives or, if only one of the joint tenants is then living, he 
acquires sole ownership in severalty.”). 
 82. See infra Section IV.B. 
 83. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 190–91 (“An executory contract to 
convey one joint tenant’s interest—assuming the contract is specifically enforceable—
severs the vendor’s undivided interest from the joint tenancy in equity, so that the vendor’s 
successors in interest will be entitled to the purchase money if the vendor dies before the 
contract is performed. [However,] the courts are divided as to whether there is a 
severance . . . when all the joint tenants join as vendors in the executory contract.”). Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing In re Baker’s Estate, 78 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1956) (holding 
that a severance is effected, so that the vendors are entitled to the purchase money as 
tenants in common)); see also Weise v. Kizer, 435 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding no severance “unless there is an indication from the contract, or from the 
circumstances, that the parties intended to sever the joint tenancy”); Alexander v. Boyer, 
253 A.2d 359, 365 (Md. 1969) (finding that an unexercised option to buy does not effect a 
severance). This division clouds the question of whether each cotenant would be entitled 
to a pro rata portion of the purchase money. 
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approach to addressing the joint tenancy implications of the unilateral 
execution of a contract to convey by one joint tenant should defer to a 
provision on point in the contract. While current standard Form 2-T 
does not cover this issue, an attorney-drafted contract to convey 
dealing with this issue might prevent future disputes.84 
e) Whether a contract to convey by all joint tenants severs during 
the executory period prior to the closing. Once again, this issue matters 
where one joint tenant dies prior to the real estate closing. The 
purchase price should be distributed pro rata according to each 
cotenant’s interest if a severance has occurred upon execution of the 
contract; if no severance occurs until the closing date, then the 
surviving joint tenant or tenants enjoy all of the purchase price, and 
the heirs or devisees of the deceased vendor joint tenant receive 
nothing. Courts are divided concerning whether severance occurs 
under these circumstances.85 The authors favor an intent-based 
analysis here as in most other “severance” scenarios. While intent 
may be unclear and subject to dispute, basing severance theory on the 
doctrine of equitable conversion removes the analysis to a clearer but 
arbitrary framework of analysis. 
f) Whether the granting of an option to purchase by one joint 
tenant severs. This issue is triggered when a joint tenant grants 
another the option to purchase the joint tenant’s interest in real 
property, the joint tenant dies during the option period, and the 
option is then timely exercised by the optionee after the death of the 
optionor.86 Severance occurs under these circumstances only if a court 
 
See also Weise v. Kizer, 435 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no severance 
“unless there is an indication from the contract, or from the circumstances, that the parties 
intended to sever the joint tenancy”); Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 365 (Md. 1969) 
(finding that an unexercised option to buy does not effect a severance)).  
 84. The authors are not suggesting that Form 2-T, Offer to Purchase and Contract 
(Revised 1/2015; jointly approved by the North Carolina Bar Association and the North 
Carolina Association of Realtors®) be amended to cover what can be considered a rare 
fact situation. The form is already twelve pages long (not counting addenda) and should 
not be expected to cover every conceivable contingency. Assuming that the grantor/joint 
tenant intends severance, the attorney who is unsure of what a North Carolina appellate 
court will conclude on this issue might resort to the old-fashioned “straw” conveyance to a 
third party and back again prior to execution of the contract to convey by the joint tenant. 
 85. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Lawes v. Bennett, 29 Eng. Rep. 1111, 1112–14 (1785) (applying a relation-
back theory combined with the doctrine of equitable conversion); Eddington v. Turner, 38 
A.2d 738, 741–42 (Del. Ch. 1944) (“The theory of the relation back of the equitable 
conversion as held in Lawes v. Bennett, does not appeal to us as either embodying the 
intent of the testator or embodying any sound principle of law or equity.”). See generally 
L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Equitable Conversion Doctrine as Applicable to Option to 
Purchase Land, in the Event of Death of Optionor or Optionee Before Its Exercise, 172 
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engages in two fictions: the doctrine of equitable conversion 
combined with the doctrine of “relation back.” The unfortunate 
reasoning is that, once an option to purchase is exercised, the exercise 
relates back to the date of the option and triggers equitable 
conversion as of that date. Under an intent-based analysis, we are 
back to the unclear issue of whether the optionor joint tenant 
intended to sever as of the granting of the option to purchase.87 
g) Whether a pending divorce action severs.88 By a traditional 
unities-based severance analysis, the commencement of an action for 
divorce and even a final decree or judgment of divorce does not sever 
any of the four unities.89 Therefore, contrary to the likely intent of 
most couples seeking and obtaining a divorce, the counterintuitive 
result is that the joint tenancy is not terminated. Under an intent-
based approach, both the institution of an action for divorce and a 
final judgment of divorce strongly indicate an implied intent by each 
spouse to terminate the survivorship feature. Jurisdictions today are 
divided, with a majority favoring an intent-based approach.90 The 
 
A.L.R. 438 (1948) (considering the applicability of equitable conversion to options to 
purchase land by analyzing the approaches taken by numerous jurisdictions). 
 87. Since it is likely that the optionor/joint tenant does intend to sever, the option 
agreement itself should include a provision on point or the optionor/joint tenant’s attorney 
should effect a severance prior to execution of the option. See Alexander, 253 A.2d at 365. 
 88. Divorces by joint tenant spouses will continue to be a rare occurrence in North 
Carolina. Divorces involving tenants by the entirety, on the other hand, number in the 
thousands each year. The tenancy by the entirety is the preferred and predominant form 
of concurrent ownership by married couples in North Carolina. However: 
 
The tenancy by the entirety differs from the joint tenancy because, in a 
substantial majority of states that recognize it, (1) the individual 
undivided interests cannot be transferred without the consent of both 
spouses; (2) the individual interests cannot be reached by creditors of 
one spouse; and (3) partition is unavailable as a remedy for owners 
who cannot agree about what to do with the property; instead, the 
owners can sever their relationship only by divorce. 
 
SINGER, supra note 79, at 356. A divorcing couple may nonetheless desire to continue to 
own real property as joint tenants. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Preston, 336 P.3d 921, 921 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished table decision) (divorcing couple agreed to continue to hold 
property as joint tenants following their divorce). 
 89. See, e.g., Young v. McIntyre, 672 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 2008) (reciting the 
common law four unities, holding that a joint tenancy is not severed by a divorce decree 
alone, but finding that a divorce settlement agreement was “sufficient to cause destruction 
of the four unities by implication” based upon an implied intent theory). 
 90. While the filing of a divorce proceeding may not be the act that actually severs the 
joint tenancy, it will in all likelihood and probability be the impetus that causes the parties 
to sever their joint tenancy. See SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.04[A][3], at 145. “Most 
courts appear to follow a presumption that a divorcing spouse does not intend to preserve 
any right of survivorship in the other spouse, and thus tend to interpret ambiguous 
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issue should not, however, be left to chance or implication. Either a 
unilateral severance or a court order expressly dealing with this 
question is the prudent way to deal with this issue. 
h) Whether a pending action for partition severs. The uniform 
rule in all jurisdictions,91 including North Carolina, is that a tenant in 
common or joint tenant is entitled as a matter of right to petition for 
and obtain a partition.92 Neither G.S. 41-2 nor Chapter 46 of the 
North Carolina General Statutes address the severance issue. The 
formal filing by one or more joint tenants of a petition to partition 
presents a quintessential example of the need for an intent-based 
approach to severance. As with pending divorce actions, it is unlikely 
that a joint tenant who has petitioned for partition intends the 
survivorship feature to continue until the partition is final. An intent-
based approach, therefore, logically requires termination of the joint 
tenancy upon filing the petition for partition.93 As a matter of 
 
agreements as terminating the joint tenancy.” Id. (citing Mann v. Bradley, 535 P.2d 213, 
214 (Colo. 1975) (agreement impliedly severed joint tenancy)). But see Porter v. Porter, 
472 So. 2d 630, 634 (Ala. 1985) (divorce decree did not sever joint tenancy); see also 
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 192 (“A divorce decree between spouses who 
are joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy if the decree does not dispose of the 
jointly held property.”); id. at 191 n.22; Porter v. Porter, 472 So. 2d 630, 630 (Ala. 1985) 
(no severance even though one spouse awarded sole possession); Estate of Layton, 52 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 251, 251 (1996). But whether a joint tenancy between spouses persists after a 
divorce decree is entered ordering the former spouses to join in sale of the property 
depends either upon the intent of the parties as evidenced in the divorce proceedings or 
upon the subjective or manifested intent of the trial judge. In re Marriage of Lutzke by 
Lutzke v. Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640, 650 (Wis. 1985).  
  In North Carolina, the issue is perhaps purely academic, since real property 
devised or conveyed to a husband and wife with nothing else appearing results in a 
tenancy by the entirety. JAMES A. WEBSTER, PATRICK K. HETRICK, & JAMES B. 
MCLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA, § 7.04[1][b], 
at 7–8 (6th ed. 2014). A tenancy by the entirety cannot be unilaterally severed and ends 
only upon the death of one spouse, a final divorce, or mutual agreement. On the other 
hand, “normal” joint tenants (those who are not married to one another) would not have 
any cause, standing, or reason to seek divorce from their cotenants rendering the issue 
moot. However, at this time, this issue has not reached a court in North Carolina, meaning 
the analysis is far from certain. 
 91. “Absent a contrary agreement, each cotenant has a right to obtain partition—
without proving any cause or reason—regardless of any inconvenience, burden or damage 
to other cotenants.” SPRANKLING, supra note 40, § 10.04[B], at 145. 
 92. WEBSTER, HETRICK, & MCLAUGHLIN, JR., supra note 90, § 7.14[1], at 7-23 (citing 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (2013); Seawell v. Seawell, 233 N.C. 735, 738, 65 S.E.2d 369, 371 
(1951); Hyman v. Edwards, 217 N.C. 342, 344, 7 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1940); Talley v. 
Murchison, 212 N.C. 205, 206, 193 S.E.2d 148, 148 (1937); Foster v. Williams, 182 N.C. 632, 
635, 109 S.E. 834, 836 (1921); Bomer v. Campbell, 70 N.C. App. 137, 139, 318 S.E.2d 841, 
842 (1984); Harris v. Harris, 51 N.C. App. 103, 107–08, 275 S.E.2d 273, 276–77 (1981)). 
 93. One might challenge this statement by creating a scenario where a non-petitioning 
joint tenant predeceases the petitioner. In fairness, severance at the commencement of the 
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preventive law, the severance issue should be addressed either at the 
commencement of the partition process by court order or by a simple 
unilateral severance procedure once one joint tenant opts to 
partition.94 
Unities-based severance theory resolves this issue in a 
counterintuitive manner by finding no severance until the partition 
process is complete.95 While most appellate courts continue to adhere 
to that theory, some acknowledge discomfort in the process and 
identify limited exceptions.96 
i)  Whether the filing of a judgment against one joint tenant severs. 
While a sale on execution of a judgment against one joint tenant 
severs, authorities are divided on the issue of whether a levy of 
execution or attachment preliminary to a sale severs.97 The common 
 
partition action benefits all parties. Intent must be measured as of a point in time and 
should not be cancelled by a fortuitous change in facts as the partition action progresses. 
 94. Another possibility, of course, is a preventive legal approach through the addition 
of a provision in Chapter 46 of the General Statutes or a comprehensive revision of G.S. 
41-2. 
 95. See, e.g., Goetz v. Slobey, 908 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 
(holding joint tenant’s commencement of partition action and moving out of the house did 
not destroy unity of interest or possession and precluded severance prior to the joint 
tenant’s death); Orlando v. Deprima, 870 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (noting 
that “the apparently universal rule in this country is that a pending suit for partition of a 
joint tenancy does not survive the death of one of the tenants”). 
 96. See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 391 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) 
(adopting exception where parties to a partition proceeding stipulated to all pertinent facts 
and all that remained to be done was a computation of the interests and liabilities of the 
joint tenants). 
 97. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 191 (“Severance of one joint 
tenant’s undivided interest from the joint tenancy may result from an involuntary transfer 
of that interest, e.g., by virtue of a sale of the interest by the joint tenant’s trustee in 
bankruptcy or by virtue of a sale on execution of a judgment against the joint tenant. But 
there is a division of authority as to whether a mere levy of execution, or an attachment, 
without sale, effects a severance. A court-ordered mortgage foreclosure sale of one joint 
tenant’s interest will, of course, sever a joint tenancy even in a ‘lien theory’ state. A 
divorce decree between spouses who are joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy if 
the decree does not dispose of the jointly held property.”). North Carolina authorizes a 
seldom used procedure authorizing a judgment creditor of a judgment debtor who owns 
an undivided interest in fee in land to institute a special proceeding for partition. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 46-5 (2013). The statute is silent on whether that action by the judgment 
creditor severs a joint tenancy, and the answer in this instance should be in the negative. 
The statute provides, in part: 
 
Upon the actual partition of the land the judgment creditor may sue 
out execution on his judgment, as allowed by law, and have the 
homestead of the judgment debtor allotted to him and sell the 
excess. . . . The remedy provided for in this section shall not deprive 
the judgment creditor of any other remedy in law or in equity which he 
may have for the enforcement of his judgment lien. 
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law rule, based upon unities-severance theory, is that the mere entry 
of judgment does not sever.98 An intent-based rule of termination of 
the joint tenancy should produce the same result. A revision of G.S. 
41-2 to cover this contingency would prevent future 
misunderstandings and litigation.99 
j) Whether the filing of a bankruptcy petition severs. This issue 
arises when a debtor joint tenant or non-debtor dies during the 
bankruptcy process.100 One commentator recently observed that, 
while few courts have ruled on this issue, a split of authority exists.101 
Courts finding a severance of the joint tenancy once a bankruptcy 
petition is filed rely on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act, 
assume that the debtor’s interest in property includes “title” to 
property, and rely on the elimination of unity of title.102 On the other 
hand, several bankruptcy cases do not find severance, perhaps in part 
based on the probable intent of the joint tenants.103 
k) Whether a mortgage or deed of trust executed by one joint 
tenant severs. The Countrywide case and a full discussion and critique 
of this issue are discussed in other parts of this article.104 In a nutshell, 
the issue is now answered by the addition of subsection (a1) to G.S. 
41-2.105 
l) Whether unilateral severance by one joint tenant occurs by a 
direct conveyance from that joint tenant to herself. In a recent 
 
 
Id. 
 98. See Fisher, supra note 42, at 658–64 (discussing the common law rule as the law of 
West Virginia, and noting that, “if the common law is not to be followed in this instance, it 
would be because it has been changed by statute”). 
 99. The authors, however, are pessimistic about the outcome of a statutory 
clarification in light of the method of clarifying the Countrywide case with the addition of 
subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2. Judgment creditors will lobby for a severance result. While 
we are not opposed to that legislative result if a full and transparent discussion of the 
competing public policies and property interests takes place, we fear another surreptitious 
amendment. 
 100. Jonathan D. Luke, Note, Joint Tenancies in Bankruptcy: Preserving Post-Petition 
Survivorship Rights for Debtors and Non-Debtors Alike, 47 IND. L. REV. 585, 596 (2014). 
 101. Id. at 599–600. 
 102. Id. at 596–98 (citing In re Yun Chin Kim, 288 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002); 
In re Tyson, 48 B.R. 412, 413–14 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1985); In re Panholzer, 36 B.R. 647, 651 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1984); In re Lambert, 34 B.R. 41, 42–43 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). 
 103. Id. at 599–602 (citing In re Anthony, 82 B.R. 386, 388 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In 
re Spain, 55 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1985)). 
 104. See infra Part II. 
 105. No matter what the jurisdiction, clearly a completed foreclosure sale severs. See, 
e.g., In re Williams, 476 B.R. 329, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (holding severance of a 
joint tenancy occurs by a completed foreclosure of one joint tenant’s interest). 
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appellate court decision in Kansas,106 two cousins owned real property 
as joint tenants with right of survivorship.107 Nine years later, one 
cousin, with the intent of severing, signed a quitclaim deed conveying 
his interest in the joint tenancy to himself, gave the deed to his 
attorney for recordation, and then died six days later.108 The Kansas 
Court of Appeals held that the cousin’s unilateral act of executing a 
quitclaim deed and giving it to his attorney for recordation effectively 
severed the joint tenancy.109 The court explained this result, in part, as 
follows: “Just as a grantor can create a joint tenancy by unilaterally 
transferring ownership to himself or herself, so should a grantor be 
able to sever a joint tenancy through self-conveyance.”110 
Will North Carolina follow the Kansas approach? The following 
more complete example should be instructive: A and B own North 
Carolina land as joint tenants with right of survivorship. A then 
executes a deed naming the grantor as “A, a joint tenant with right of 
survivorship” and naming the grantee as “A, a tenant in common.” 
The deed language adds: “the purpose of this deed is to unilaterally 
sever the joint tenancy between A and B and convert ownership to a 
tenancy in common.” 
North Carolina has no appellate court decision directly on point 
to this example. In an 1853 decision, the Supreme Court held that an 
infant en ventre sa mere and born within 280 days of execution of the 
deed was capable of taking as grantee in a deed.111 The court opinion 
recites the following maxims: “Property must at all times have an 
owner. One person cannot part with the ownership unless there be 
another person to take it from him. There must be a ‘grantor and a 
grantee, and a thing granted.’”112 Because the foundation for the 
common law rule was the ancient ceremony of feoffment by livery of 
seisin, there is no contemporary public policy rationale for applying 
 
 106. Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d 219 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). 
 107. Id. at 220. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 223. 
 110. Id. at 222. 
 111. Dupree v. Dupree, 45 N.C. 164, 164–65 (1853); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5 
(2013) (“An infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person capable of taking by 
deed or other writing any estate whatever in the same manner as if he were born.”); 
Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 155, 52 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1949). 
 112. Dupree, 45 N.C. at 167; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296 
(“So as in every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted . . . .”). 
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the rule to the unilateral severance of a joint tenancy by a deed from 
the joint tenant grantor to himself as a tenant in common.113 
In a sense A’s conveyance is by A as the owner of one distinct 
category of concurrent ownership to A as owner of another distinct 
category. With legal advice, A could have easily severed by use of a 
straw-person and subsequently receiving a conveyance back. Since a 
joint tenancy can now be created by a conveyance from A to A and 
B, there is little or no reason to require A to go through the straw 
transaction to sever.114 Contemporary hornbooks and treatises list the 
requirements of a valid deed as including an identification of grantor 
and grantee.115 That requirement should not preclude the severance 
deed in the above example. Above all, a court should honor A’s clear 
intent.116 
m) Whether severance by implication, including a written statement 
or agreement of severance without a conveyance, is recognized. 
Applying an intent-based test for whether severance occurs by 
implication through the agreements and conduct of joint tenants—
particularly if understandings are based on informal communications 
and oral agreements—will undoubtedly qualify these scenarios as 
litigation magnets. The traditional unities-based approach to 
severance, on the other hand, provides a challenging but not 
insurmountable test.117 In addition, some jurisdictions take an intent-
based approach, recognizing the concept of intent to sever by 
implication, including severance through the conduct of the joint 
tenants.118 
 
 113. Dupree, 45 N.C. at 168 (“Suppose a case of land, which at common law could only 
pass by feoffment. To whom, or to what could livery of seisen [sic] have been made? Who 
would have performed the services?”). 
 114. See supra Section I.B for the discussion of the “Elimination of Three of the Four 
Common Law Unities.” 
 115. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 11.1, at 807–08; SPRANKLING, supra 
note 40, § 23.04[A][1], at 379. 
 116. What the authors consider the distastefulness of stealth unilateral severances is 
discussed infra Section IV.B. 
 117. See, e.g., Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 667–68 
(N.M. 2012) (recognizing intent-based severance by implication via an agreement between 
all joint tenants inconsistent with the four unities or right with the right of survivorship). 
 118. See, e.g., Estate of Woods v. McBeth, No. B240946, 2013 WL 5772025, at *3–4 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2013) (stating that the unexecuted settlement agreement 
demonstrated intent to sever pursuant to California Civil Code section 683.2, but the 
court’s decision nonetheless discusses traditional “four unities”). 
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D. Appellate Court Silence on Creation and Severance Issues 
With the exception of the Countrywide “deed of trust/severance 
holding,” there is no other North Carolina appellate court decision 
since the 1991 reincarnation of the joint tenancy on any other 
traditional creation and severance issues, despite these issues being 
commonplace in other jurisdictions. Why? In an overwhelming 
majority of other states, the traditional tenancy by the entirety is not 
recognized,119 and the most utilitarian replacement has been the joint 
tenancy or community property. North Carolina, on the other hand, 
recognizes, presumes, and thereby encourages the tenancy by the 
entirety form of ownership for married couples.120 Recent trends in 
North Carolina, however, indicate an increasing use of the joint 
tenancy form of ownership, particularly among non-married couples. 
A second explanation for the dearth of existing North Carolina 
appellate court decisions on traditional joint tenancy issues since 1991 
is that the transaction costs of appealing matters of civil law combined 
with the time delay in ultimate resolution can consume years. In other 
words, the paucity of controversies may be confirmation only of the 
reality that the game of resolving traditional joint tenancy issues in 
court most often is not worth the candle.121 Thus, hundreds, and 
perhaps thousands, of North Carolina creation and severance issues 
may arise each year, but they neither grace trial court nor court of 
appeals chambers. 
E. The Need for Clarification 
Additional statutory guidance on both joint tenancy creation and 
severance issues is appropriate because mistakes in attempting to 
create a joint tenancy, or achieving or attempting to achieve a 
severance, are commonplace, particularly where a layperson engages 
 
 119. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.5, at 193 (noting that “tenancies 
by the entirety have now been abolished in all but twenty jurisdictions”). 
 120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (2013). See supra note 73 for the text of this subsection. 
This statute presuming a tenancy by the entirety might also include a provision that a 
failed attempt to create a tenancy by the entirety should result in the creation of a joint 
tenancy, the closest default form of concurrent ownership. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
184, § 7 (2011) (“A conveyance or devise of land to two persons as tenants by the entirety, 
who are not married to each other, shall create an estate in joint tenancy and not a tenancy 
in common.”). Unfortunately, the tenancy by the entirety is periodically under attack by 
creditors seeking a way to reach entirety assets for the debt of one spouse. 
 121. Most appellate court decisions are appeals, in part at least, of a summary 
judgment motion and can often result in a remand and, therefore, a continuing transaction 
cost. 
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in self-help drafting.122 If cases from other jurisdictions are any 
indication, even experienced attorneys sometimes overlook a 
potential severance issue that often results in no harm but that 
sometimes comes back to haunt the parties. If, for example, an 
attorney does not recognize that, in her jurisdiction, the 
commencement of a divorce proceeding does not in and of itself sever 
the joint tenancy, no harm occurs if both joint tenants survive until a 
final decree or judgment that addresses the matter. Likewise, a 
petition for partition by one joint tenant does not sever a joint 
tenancy in many jurisdictions, and no problem arises where all joint 
tenants survive to the final partition sale or division in kind. But 
preventive law requires skilled attorneys to consider “worst case 
scenarios.” While a rare occurrence, one joint tenant might 
predecease the other during the pendency of a divorce action or 
partition proceeding. The standard assumption in a divorce is, we 
assume, that neither unhappy spouse intends for the other to take by 
survivorship after the action has commenced. Likewise, the often-
disgruntled joint tenant who wishes to end the joint tenancy by 
petitioning for partition probably presumes logically but erroneously 
in some jurisdictions that the survivorship feature ends with the 
petition.123 
F. A Joint Tenancy that Cannot Be “Broken” 
Unilateral severance, particularly stealth unilateral severance 
without notice to the other joint tenant or joint tenants, is the 
Achilles’ heel of contemporary American joint tenancy law. In a 
recent case, for example, a mother conveyed property to her daughter 
and her niece in 2001 “as joint tenants with right of survivorship and 
not as tenants in common.”124 The deed also included the following 
language: “IT IS THE INTENTION of all the parties of this deed 
that title shall vest in the grantees as joint tenants, so that on the 
death of one of them the survivor will take the whole estate herein 
conveyed.”125 
 
 122. See, e.g., Crossland v. Crossland, No. CV126028025, 2013 WL 1849272, at *1–3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013). 
 123. Preventive law in a jurisdiction following a unities-based approach to severance in 
these instances dictates either (i) a prompt motion for a court order eliminating the 
survivorship feature, or; (ii) a unilateral conveyance of one joint tenant’s interest to the 
venerable straw-man who will dutifully re-convey back, an archaic—and we argue silly—
but effective legal cure. 
 124. Kail v. Knudeson, 328 P.3d 1235, 1236 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014). 
 125. Id. 
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The mother died shortly after the deed was executed and 
recorded, and the niece did not become aware of the deed until four 
years later.126 Subsequently the niece unilaterally severed the joint 
tenancy by executing a deed of the property to a third party who 
promptly deeded the property back.127 All deeds were duly recorded, 
and subsequent conveyances were made of the niece’s fifty percent 
interest.128 The daughter, upset about the unilateral severance, 
commenced an action in 2010 to reform or cancel her mother’s 2001 
deed.129 She asserted that her mother’s true intent was to create a 
joint tenancy that one joint tenant “could not break.”130 While a 
normal reading of the 2001 deed might justify a layperson’s opinion 
that the joint tenancy “could never be broken,” the court properly 
rejected the daughter’s argument.131 The niece’s actions clearly 
severed the joint tenancy in all jurisdictions on either an “intent” or 
“severance of a unity” theory.132 
II.  COUNTRYWIDE133 
Hindered by a lack of statutory guidance, including the 
numerous shortcomings and general incompleteness of G.S. 41-2, the 
court of appeals in Countrywide addressed a predictable severance 
scenario. Importantly, the legal dispute before the court presented an 
opportunity to focus on the quintessential policy question of whether 
severance theory should be unities-based or intent-based. As the 
following discussion of Countrywide reveals, the court opted for a 
traditional unities-based analysis while providing examples of statutes 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1236–37. 
 131. Id. at 1238. (quoting Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 184 P.3d 518, 526 (Okla. 2008) 
(noting that “ignorance of the law is no excuse and every person is presumed to know the 
law”). 
 132. See, e.g., Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W. 2d 85, 87–88 (Mich. 1990) (recognizing two 
different types of joint tenancies, one “standard,” one “indestructible”). An indestructible 
joint tenancy is not severable by unilateral action because that would deprive the other of 
her right of survivorship. Id.  
 133. 220 N.C. App. 504, 725 S.E.2d 667 (2012). The troubled history of Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc. is well known in real estate circles. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Walter 
Hamilton, BofA to Pay $16.65-billion over Soured Home Loans in Mortgage Meltdown, 
L.A. TIMES (August 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bank-america-
settlement-20140822-story.html. For more insight into the subprime mortgage market 
meltdown of 2008, including Countrywide’s loan practices, see BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE 
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 138–45 (2010). 
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from two other jurisdictions for consideration by members of the 
General Assembly. 
A. The Facts 
The following description by the court of appeals provides more 
detailed facts than the abstract134 introducing this article: 
The record tends to show the following: On 25 March 2001, 
Margaret D. Smith (“Mrs. Smith”) and Mrs. Smith’s daughter 
and son-in-law, Judy and Troy Reed (“Defendants”), executed 
an offer to purchase and contract to buy a home in Mooresville, 
North Carolina. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (“Plaintiff”) 
agreed to finance the purchase of the home and provided a loan 
to Mrs. Smith in the amount of $117,900.00. The general 
warranty deed named the grantees as “Margaret D. Smith and 
Troy D. Reed and wife, Judy C. Reed Joint Tenants with rights 
of survivorship[.]” The deed of trust to secure Plaintiff’s loan 
and promissory note was prepared in Mrs. Smith’s name only 
and was executed by Mrs. Reed, as attorney in fact for Mrs. 
Smith, on 1 May 2001. Neither Mr. Reed nor Mrs. Reed signed 
the deed of trust or promissory note in his or her individual 
capacity.135 
Following the closing, all three lived together in the home with 
the daughter and son-in-law caring for the elderly mother “such that 
Mrs. Smith was not required to go to a nursing home.”136 Less than 
five months after the closing, the mortgage loan went into default and 
foreclosure proceedings were commenced.137 Mrs. Smith died several 
years later in 2004 while the mortgage loan remained in default and 
prior to any foreclosure sale.138 Several months later, ongoing 
negotiations took place between Mr. and Mrs. Reed and resulted in a 
loan modification agreement “purportedly” amending and 
supplementing the original deed of trust.139 In 2006, the Reeds sought 
a further loan modification, which was denied.140 
 
 134. See supra pp. 101–02. 
 135. Countrywide, 220 N.C. App. at 505, 725 S.E.2d at 668. 
 136. Id. at 505, 725 S.E.2d at 669. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 506, 725 S.E.2d at 669. 
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B. The Trial Court 
In 2009, Countrywide filed a complaint against the Reeds seeking 
reformation of the deed of trust to make them obligors under the 
mortgage loan.141 The Reeds filed an answer and counterclaims 
alleging negligent misrepresentation and a violation of North 
Carolina mortgage law.142 In 2011, Countrywide filed a summary 
judgment motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on both its 
claim as plaintiff and the defendant Reeds’ counterclaims.143 The 
Reeds promptly filed a motion for summary judgment raising the 
statute of limitations as a bar to reformation and denied any liability 
for the mortgage loan.144 
The trial court granted summary judgment in Countrywide’s 
favor.145 When the dust settled on the trial court’s analysis, Mrs. 
Smith’s one-half interest was found to be vested in the Reeds by 
survivorship, but remained subject to the Countrywide deed of 
trust.146 The Reeds’ one-half undivided interest owned as tenants by 
the entirety was held not to be encumbered.147 
C. The Court of Appeals 
The court of appeals, faced with the first traditional joint 
tenancy/severance issue in North Carolina history, noted that the 
question presented was a “novel one.”148 In truth, most joint tenancy 
issues that the appellate courts of this state will face in coming years 
will also be cases of first impression and, therefore, “novel” ones. 
After recognizing that the deed to Mrs. Smith and the defendants 
created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the court recited the 
fact that Mrs. Smith became the sole obligor under the deed of trust 
filed one minute after delivery of the general warranty deed.149 Next, 
the court summarized the issue by holding “the deed of trust severed 
the joint tenancy,”150 thus limiting the encumbrance to the portion 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 669. 
 147. Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 669–70. The trial court’s judgment does not use the terms 
“joint tenancy” or “severance.” Paragraph 5 of the order reads: “Troy D. Reed and wife 
Judy Reed own the real property in fee simple absolute; subject to Plaintiff’s deed of trust 
encumbering a one-half undivided interest in said property.” Id. at 507, 725 S.E.2d at 670. 
 148. Id. at 509, 725 S.E.2d at 671. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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owned by Mrs. Smith. In the alternative, if “the deed of trust did not 
sever the joint tenancy,” the encumbrance would attach to the entire 
property.151 
The statement of the second issue bears careful scrutiny because 
it begs an important question of joint tenancy law. For if a deed of 
trust executed by only one joint tenant does not sever the joint 
tenancy, the crucial issue then becomes whether the deed of trust 
encumbrance ceases to exist when the mortgagor joint tenant dies. 
Professor Singer notes that “the courts are split,” but further observes 
that “most states provide that, even though the mortgage does not 
sever the joint tenancy, it survives the death of the joint tenant who 
granted the mortgage and continues to burden that fractional interest 
that is now owned by the surviving joint tenant.”152 We find the 
apparent majority rule to be a counterintuitive approach favoring 
savvy mortgagees with constructive knowledge of the status of title to 
the mortgaged property over the survivorship property rights of the 
non-signing joint tenant. 
The court of appeals recognized the split in other jurisdictions on 
the issue in the following note located at the end of the decision. 
Other States have codified statutes addressing the particular 
question raised in this appeal, and our General Assembly may 
also consider and address this issue, should it be so inclined. 
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 27-7-40(a)(iii) (2011) 
prohibits any encumbrance of a joint tenancy unless all joint 
tenants join in the encumbrance. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-7-
40(a)(iii) (providing, “[t]he fee interest in real estate held in 
joint tenancy may not be encumbered by a joint tenant acting 
alone without the joinder of the other joint tenant or tenants in 
the encumbrance”). In Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 700.24 (2011) 
provides that on the death of a mortgaging joint tenant the 
survivor takes subject to the mortgage. See Wis. Stat. § 700.24 
(stating that a real estate mortgage, a security interest, or a lien 
“on or against the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat the 
right of survivorship in the event of the death of such joint 
tenant, but the surviving joint tenant or tenants take the 
interest such deceased joint tenant could have transferred prior 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. SINGER, supra note 79, at 352 (citing Harms v. Sprague, 456 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983) for the first proposition and citing Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d 978, 981–82 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) and WIS. STAT. § 700.24 (2001) for the second). 
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to death subject to such mortgage, security interest or statutory 
lien”).153 
The helpful reference by the court of appeals to the statutes of two 
other jurisdictions evidences perhaps an unspoken uneasiness by the 
court concerning its resolution of the severance issue. True, the 
court’s result is logically correct based on a traditional common law 
“severance of unities approach,” but it sacrifices the obvious intent of 
the parties to create a joint tenancy. As we discuss below, the General 
Assembly’s legislative response has numerous shortcomings. 
III.  A FLAWED LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO COUNTRYWIDE 
As summarized immediately above, the court of appeals 
concluded in Countrywide with a helpful footnote that pointed out 
the distinctly different approaches of two other states while deferring 
to the legislature “should it be so inclined.”154 In this Part of the 
article, we report that the General Assembly opted to adopt the 
mortgagee-friendly Wisconsin approach over the South Carolina 
approach favoring non-signing joint tenants. Further, we opine that 
the legislative response is flawed for a number of practical, public 
policy, and theoretical reasons. 
A. Countrywide “Reversed” and More 
Pressured, assumedly by mortgage lenders and other creditors, 
the General Assembly promptly responded to Countrywide by adding 
new subsection (a1) to G.S. 41-2 as follows: 
(a1) Upon conveyance to the trustee of a deed of trust by any 
or all of the joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship to secure a loan, the joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship shall be deemed not to be severed, and 
upon satisfaction of the deed of trust, legal title to the property 
subject to the joint tenancy shall revert to the grantors as joint 
tenants with right of survivorship in the respective shares as 
owned by the respective grantors at the time of the execution of 
the deed of trust, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the 
deed of trust or other instrument recorded subsequent to the 
deed of trust.155 
 
 153. Countrywide, 220 N.C. App. at 510–11 n.2, 725 S.E.2d at 672 n.2. See infra Section 
III.A for a discussion of what we consider the flawed legislative response to Countrywide. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 322, § 41-2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 575, 577 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013)). 
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However, as is unfortunately too often the case with important 
statutory changes to North Carolina real property law, the new 
subsection passed through the General Assembly flying quietly under 
the radar without meaningful opportunity for vetting by concerned 
consumer groups and the practicing bar in general. The new joint 
tenancy law subsection was buried in the midst of a fourteen-page 
session law with a title making no reference to the key change in 
mortgage law.156 Indeed, the session law focuses on an extensive 
revision and clarification of notary public law, with ten sections 
dedicated to that area preceding the addition of the new joint tenancy 
law subsection of G.S. 41-2(a1),157 with twenty-six additional sections 
on notary public issues immediately following.158 Finally, the session 
law adds a series of statutory amendments addressing satisfaction of 
security interest procedures, sections that have nothing to do with the 
new joint tenancy subsection, G.S. 41-2(a1).159 For these reasons it is 
doubtful that the new joint tenancy language received much notice in 
advance of enactment. 
B. Critique of the Amendment 
As seen above in the language of the new subsection G.S. 41-
2(a1), the statute allows a mortgagee to obtain a deed of trust 
executed by only one joint tenant, who then predeceases the other or 
others, that encumbers the surviving non-mortgagor/joint tenant’s (or 
joint tenants’) title to the property. While there is no case directly on 
point, the clear result of this statutory approach is to render the title 
of the survivor or survivors unmarketable until the mortgage debt of 
the deceased joint tenant is satisfied.160 
The one-sided language favoring the mortgagee materially alters 
the traditional law of joint tenancy. Under the statute, the joint 
tenancy is not deemed severed, and legal title to the property does 
 
 156. Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 322, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 575 (The session law is titled: 
“AN ACT MAKING CORRECTIONS AND OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE 
NOTARY PUBLIC ACT, MAKING OTHER CONFORMING CHANGES, AND 
PROVIDING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SATISFACTION OF 
SECURITY INSTRUMENTS.”). 
 157. Id. §§ 1.1 to .10. The revision to G.S. 41-2(a1) is located at section 1.11. 
 158. Id. §§ 1.12 to .38. 
 159. Id. §§ 2.1 to .8. 
 160. See, e.g., Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 N.C. 595, 598, 146 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1966) 
(quoting Pack v. Newman, 232 N.C. 397, 400, 61 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1950)) (defining 
“marketable title” as title “free from reasonable doubt in law or fact as to its validity”); 
Kniep v. Templeton, 185 N.C. App. 622, 633, 649 S.E.2d 425, 432 (2007) (defining 
“marketable title” as title that is free from major defect). 
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not “revert” to the grantors, until the deed of trust is satisfied.161 The 
language salvages the ineptitude of a commercial mortgagee—always 
represented by attorneys—who nonetheless ignorantly granted a 
mortgage loan to one joint tenant without obtaining the signature of 
the other(s). Meanwhile, the losers under subsection (a1) will often 
be a consumer/mortgagor not represented by an attorney and a non-
signing joint tenant who had nothing to do with the promissory note 
and loan documents. In Countrywide, for example, joint tenants Judy 
and Troy Reed, the daughter and son-in-law of Mrs. Smith (the only 
joint tenant to sign the note and deed of trust at the closing) never 
applied for the mortgage loan, were not named in the note or deed of 
trust, and were not asked by the mortgagee to sign the note as 
borrowers.162 
The new subsection concludes with a provision holding the joint 
tenancy in abeyance on a mortgage executed by the predeceasing 
joint tenant/mortgagor valid until the mortgage debt is satisfied. This 
is the case “unless a contrary intent is expressed in the deed of trust 
or other instrument recorded subsequent to the deed of trust.”163 The 
language, while appearing to be even-handed, does not ring true from 
the typical consumer/mortgagor’s vantage point. In almost all 
residential mortgage loan transactions, mortgagees dictate the 
contents of a deed of trust and will take care not to include language 
suggesting a “contrary intent.” Consequently, the language is of no 
value to consumers, a waste of legislative ink. 
A major shortcoming of subsection (a1) is that the statutory 
language runs contrary to a cardinal principle of joint tenancy law: A 
surviving joint tenant does not take title to the property by a 
survivorship transfer at the death of the predeceasing joint tenant. 
Rather, the surviving joint tenant takes the entire estate by virtue of 
the joint tenancy estate created by the original conveyance.164 As one 
hornbook author colorfully observes: 
The right of survivorship stems from the common law’s 
schizophrenic vision of a joint tenancy, expressed in archaic 
French as “per my et per tout.” Joint tenants were seen as both 
(a) a unit that owned the entire estate and (b) individuals who 
each owned an undivided fractional share (or moiety) in the 
 
 161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013). 
 162. Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 5, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 
N.C. App. 504, 725 S.E.2d 667 (2012) (No. COA11-769). 
 163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1). 
 164. David E. Missirian, Separate But Equal? Same Sex Couples in New England, 35 
REAL EST. L.J. 558, 559 (2007). 
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estate. Since joint tenant D already owned the entire estate, C’s 
death was not seen as creating any new rights in D. Rather, the 
death merely withdrew C’s interest from the estate, leaving D 
as the only remaining owner.165 
Put another way, the right of survivorship is not a future interest 
like a reversion or remainder. Accordingly, a surviving joint tenant 
does not receive anything from a decedent joint tenant.166 
In spite of a national split of authority on whether a mortgage 
lien continues after the death of the joint tenant/mortgagor, the 
General Assembly’s approach to this issue runs counter to a 
foundational principle of real property law: A grantee can acquire no 
greater title than the grantor has,167 for “a stream can flow no higher 
than its source.”168 Ultimately, the subsection language awards a 
mortgagee of the joint tenant/mortgagor a bonus at the expense of 
diminishing the real property interest of the non-mortgaging joint 
tenant. 
Accepting arguendo that subsection (a1) serves a valid public 
purpose by preserving a deed of trust as security after the death of a 
mortgagor/joint tenant, it nonetheless obscures that purpose with 
language that perplexes when applied to basic joint tenancy fact 
situations. For example, assume that, on November 5, 2013, A and B 
take title to North Carolina land as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship; on March 26, 2014, B unilaterally executes a deed of 
trust of B’s interest in the land to a mortgagee to secure repayment of 
B’s loan, and; B then dies on February 17, 2015, leaving few assets 
and owing a substantial amount of money on the mortgage loan. 
Applying the literal language of (a1) to this example, “the joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship shall be deemed not to be 
severed.”169 A joint tenancy, therefore, continues to exist between A 
& B in our example after B’s unilateral execution of a deed of trust in 
 
 165. SPRANKLING, supra note 40, §10.02[B][1], at 132. Sprankling defines “per my et 
per tout” as meaning “by the share and by the whole.” Id. § 10.02[B][1], at 132 n.7; see also 
Fisher, supra note 42, at 640 (citing 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A. James 
Casner ed., 1952) (noting, inter alia, that the right of survivorship in the joint tenancy is not 
a type of future interest, and that the deceased joint tenant’s estate is extinguished upon 
his or her death)). 
 166. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 5.3, at 183 n.6 (citing 2 HERBERT 
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 419 (3d ed. 1939)). 
 167. Ashworth v. Bullock, 304 P.3d 74, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a joint 
tenant may not transfer more than his or her own interest in joint tenancy property). 
 168. Quotation attributed to Dr. Robert E. Lee. Dr. Lee was a Professor of Law and 
dean emeritus at Wake Forest University Law School. Professor Lee died in 1977. 
 169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(a1) (2013). 
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2014; but B then died, and A is the now the sole owner of the land. 
The (a1) language continues to befuddle when it continues: 
[A]nd upon satisfaction of the deed of trust, legal title to the 
property subject to the joint tenancy shall revert to the grantors 
as joint tenants with right of survivorship in the respective 
shares as owned by the respective grantors at the time of the 
execution of the deed of trust.170 
Once again, the statutory language is puzzling when applied to a 
simple scenario. Assuming that the statute requires payment of the 
mortgage loan by A to clear the real property of the mortgage 
encumbrance—the joint tenant who did not execute the mortgage 
note and deed of trust—and assuming A pays the outstanding 
mortgage loan balance to satisfy the deed of trust, it makes no sense 
at all in this example to apply the statutory language. A is now the 
sole owner of the property. In no way can title to the joint tenancy 
revert as directed by the statute. Presumably, the intent of the drafter 
of subsection (a1) would have been better served by stating that a 
mortgage lien continues to encumber joint tenancy property after the 
death of a mortgagor/joint tenant to the extent of that mortgagor’s 
interest when she executed the deed of trust; i.e., the surviving joint 
tenant or tenants take subject to the mortgage to that extent. 
The Countrywide fact situation is nothing but a slight variation 
on the above example. While three people—mother, daughter, and 
son-in-law—took title as joint tenants with right of survivorship, 
North Carolina law treats the married couple as “one,” owning a fifty 
percent undivided interest as tenants by the entirety as between each 
other.171 Thus, when the mother died, only one legal person, the 
husband-wife entity, remained.172 As of her death, the joint tenancy 
ceased to exist in spite of the statutory language deeming it not 
severed by the mother’s execution of the deed of trust.173 
Finally, it is counterintuitive as a matter of public policy that 
mortgagees, without fail represented by attorneys and loan officers, 
merit statutory protection from their folly in a Countrywide 
mortgage-loan situation where, casting all common sense to the wind, 
a mortgagee accepts the signature of only one of three joint tenants 
on a deed of trust. Prior to and after the enactment of new subsection 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 510, 725 S.E.2d 667, 
671 (2012). 
 172. Id. at 509–10, 725 S.E.2d at 671 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2(b)). 
 173. Id. at 510, 725 S.E.2d at 671–72. 
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(a1), prudent mortgagees need only obtain the signatures of all joint 
tenants to adequately secure repayment of the mortgage loan. 
Instead, in light of the new subsection, mortgagees will potentially 
enjoy a windfall at the expense of the joint tenant who has not signed 
the deed of trust, and might not even have knowledge of its execution 
by the other joint tenant. Ultimately, the new language encourages 
mortgage loans secured by the signature of only one joint tenant.174 
IV.  CREATION AND SEVERANCE ISSUES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS: 
HISTORICAL PREJUDICE TO EMERGING EMBRACE 
As we have demonstrated, the joint tenancy estate has coursed a 
tumultuous, winding road in American jurisprudence over the past 
two centuries.175 Joint tenancies were once readily accepted and 
recognized as a preferred form of concurrent property ownership 
within early American common law.176 That preferred status did not 
last long, however. The sweeping political reform ushered in by the 
American Revolution included casting aside English common law 
notions of primogeniture, whereby the eldest son inherited the family 
estate, and the jus accrescendi, or right of survivorship, concomitant 
 
 174. Harkening back to our discussion of “predictable creation issues,” supra Section 
I.C.1, would prospective concurrent owners of real property be better off taking title in 
one of the following ways? 
 
1) “to A & B jointly with right of survivorship and not as joint 
tenants;” 
2) “to A & B for their joint lives with right of survivorship and not as 
joint tenants;” 
3) “to A & B as joint life tenants, contingent remainder to the survivor, 
and not as joint tenants,” or; 
4) “to A & B as tenants in common with right of survivorship and not 
as joint tenants.” 
 
Admittedly, each alternative comes with its own theoretical and practical 
inventory of strengths and weaknesses, although each would not fall under the 
purview of subsection (1b). 
 175. See generally John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law: Plus ça Change . . ., 5 GREEN BAG 
2D 173 (2002) (chronicling the history of joint tenancy law and suggesting continued 
stability of and societal demand for the joint tenancy estate). 
 176. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 31.06(a) (David 
A. Thomas ed., 2004) [hereinafter THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY]; see, e.g., Alexander 
v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 363 (Md. 1969) (citing Hannan v. Towers, 3 H. & J. 147, 148–49 
(Md. 1810) (“At common law it was presumed that a conveyance to two or more persons 
created a joint tenancy.”); Wilson v. Johnson, 46 P. 833, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1896) 
(“Estates in entirety and joint tenancies are recognized by our supreme court as existing in 
Kansas, and, until the passage of chapter 203 of the Session Laws of 1891, the right of 
survivorship under the common law was in full force and effect.”). 
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to joint tenancies.177 Beginning in the latter half of the 18th century, 
acceptance of joint tenancies as a natural form of concurrent 
ownership quickly turned to repudiation as states and territories 
began rejecting joint tenancies as intrinsically un-American.178 The 
rapidity of the movement against joint tenancies was expressed in 
anything but parsed words. Courts and legislatures alike denounced 
joint tenancies with bitter contempt describing these estates as 
“odious and unjust,”179 “odious in equity,”180 and “adverse to the 
understandings, habits, and feelings of the people.”181 The tenor of the 
day is best reflected within the preamble to a 1784 North Carolina 
omnibus statute abolishing joint tenancy that proclaims: “In real and 
personal estate held in joint-tenancy the benefit of the survivor is 
manifest injustice to the families of such as may happen to die first.”182 
For the better part of the past two centuries, legislatures, courts, 
and practitioners have largely continued to hold firm to the notion 
that joint tenancies should be viewed with hostility, are nothing more 
than a mere gamble, and create harsh and unforeseen results.183 Yet, 
neither this continued hostility nor abolition of the common law form 
of joint tenancies has ended use of the estate. Despite historic 
opposition, the joint tenancy estate remarkably has endured and 
remains an ever-popular form of concurrent ownership.184 Joint 
tenancies are common in the financial industry for the ownership of 
 
 177. Orth, supra note 175, at 177. 
 178. See, e.g., Burnett v. Pratt, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 556, 557 (1839) (“Even the common 
law now favors tenancies in common . . . and the policy of our legislation is decidedly 
adverse to joint tenancies. The doctrine of survivorship is not in accordance with the 
genius of our institutions.”); Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305, 306 (1826) (“The laws 
passed, both during the territorial government and since, authorize joint tenants, tenants 
in common, and coparceners, and, in some cases, the executors, administrators, or 
guardians of such persons, to demand and have partition. It is, from this, evident that the 
legislature have treated a joint tenancy as a tenancy in common.”); Lynch v. Frost, 727 
P.2d 698, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Choman v. Epperley 592 P.2d 714, 719 (Wyo. 1979) 
(“[T]he policy of the American law is opposed to the creation of a joint tenancy with the 
entire property going to the survivor, at least unless the parties clearly demonstrate that is 
the intent . . . .”)). 
 179. Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337, 340 (1836). 
 180. Davidson’s Lessee v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459, 461 (Pa. 1799). 
 181. Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305, 306 (1826). 
 182. Act of 1784, ch. 22, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
574 (Walter Clark ed., 1905) (emphasis added). 
 183. Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1969) (citing A. R. Kimbrough, 
Comment, Cotenancy: Effect of Conveyances, Leases, and Encumbrances of One 
Contenant in Excess of His Interest: Joint Tenancy: Effect of Lease as to Severance: 
Remedies of Cotenants as Against Each Other, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 203, 208 (1937)); Cleaver 
v. Long, 126 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ohio 1955) (“Many members of the legal profession in Ohio 
are of the opinion that joint tenancy is a thing to be frowned upon in this State . . . .”). 
 184. Orth, supra note 175, at 180. 
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joint accounts,185 utilized by domestic partners to share property,186 
offer value in avoiding probate delays and expenses,187 and provide 
useful tools for elder and estate planning,188 among other uses. 
Notwithstanding its popularity, historic skepticism has continued 
unnecessarily to pervade legislative and judicial treatment of the joint 
tenancy estate, slowing its progress as a contemporary tool for asset 
management. 
We now turn to a brief overview of some of the issues that 
continue to plague the joint tenancy estate while illustrating some of 
the preferable statutory approaches to creation and destruction. As 
part of this endeavor, we will illustrate several progressive statutes 
that may serve as models for North Carolina and other states in 
taking a more enlightened view of joint tenancies in recognition of 
their continued use and popularity. We begin with a brief discussion 
of common law jurisprudence and the original context in which joint 
tenancies were created before examining how colonial presumptions 
disfavoring the estate continue to infect modern interpretational 
issues. Next we explore an array of word choice considerations 
affecting creation issues given the significant weight courts afford to 
the precise language utilized in creating the joint tenancy estate. 
Thereafter we delve into the abyss that is terminating joint tenancies, 
the conflicting interests at stake, and the multitude of approaches 
courts and legislatures have applied to destroying joint tenancy 
interests. We conclude with a brief proposal for revising North 
Carolina’s joint tenancy statute and the best formula for any statute 
addressing the modern joint tenancy estate. 
A. Creating Joint Tenancies: Unities to Express Intent   
At common law, creating joint tenancies was entirely formalistic 
in nature. A joint tenancy was deemed created by deed or devise 
upon the conversion of the four unities of time, title, interest, and 
possession.189 Simply, all tenants having “one and the same interest, 
accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and 
the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession” 
 
 185. See, e.g., Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. 2009). 
 186. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 P.3d 984, 995–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
 187. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (2013) (“Whereas joint tenancy with right 
of survivorship permits property to pass to the survivor without the cost or delay of 
probate proceedings, there shall be a form of co-ownership of property, real and personal, 
known as joint tenancy.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 
691–92 (Minn. 1968). 
 189. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[2], at 51-3 to -4. 
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were considered joint tenants with the jus accrescendi right of 
survivorship.190 Absent words of contrary expression, a conveyance as 
basic as “to A and B and their heirs” immediately created a joint 
tenancy.191 American courts sometimes referred to this form of 
creation as “technical joint tenancy.”192 The absence of any one or 
more of the four unities resulted in a failure of the joint tenancy 
estate, irrespective of the intent of the parties.193 
Although since denounced as manifestly unjust, the common law 
four-unities approach to creating joint tenancies was not without 
benefit. The specificity of each separate unity offered concrete terms 
on which parties and courts could rely to determine the creation of 
the joint tenancy estate.194 Those guideposts for creating joint 
tenancies were largely lost when technical joint tenancy fell into 
disfavor. The mere existence of the four unities by deed or devise will 
not create a joint tenancy in any American state today.195 
The majority of modern state statutes addressing joint tenancies 
permit joint tenancies to be created by express declaration while 
jettisoning the concept of technical joint tenancy in favor of tenancies 
in common.196 A prime example is Maryland’s statute, which cuts off 
common law joint tenancy while preserving the right of parties to 
create the estate by simply stating: 
No deed, will, or other written instrument which affects land or 
personal property, creates an estate in joint tenancy, unless the 
deed, will, or other written instrument expressly provides that 
the property granted is to be held in joint tenancy.197 
Maryland’s statute offers the clearest expression of legislative 
abrogation of technical joint tenancies and embrace of joint tenancies 
created by express terms. In fact, it is representative of the majority of 
states that, in one form or another, echo the sentiment that joint 
tenancies may only be created by an express declaration.198 Its 
simplicity has enabled Maryland courts to easily conclude that the 
legislature has embraced the rights of individuals to establish joint 
 
 190. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180–81. 
 191. Id. at *180. 
 192. See, e.g., In re Hutchison’s Estate, 166 N.E. 687, 690 (Ohio 1929). 
 193. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(b), at 15. 
 194. In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 498 n.6 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the 
clarity provided by the four unities that, in theory, offered a bright-line test for the 
determination of joint tenancies). 
 195. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-5. 
 196. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(d), at 23. 
 197. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 198. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-5. 
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tenancies by express declaration.199 And its specificity offers flexible 
options for parties seeking to create joint tenancies by clarifying that 
they may do so by deed, will, or any other written instrument.200 In 
doing so, the statute obviates the need for separate provisions 
addressing different types of property, whether real or personal, or 
different types of individual situations in which joint tenancies may be 
utilized. 
1.  Presumptions and Construction of Joint Tenancies 
Statutes enabling the creation of joint tenancies by express 
declaration offer a foot in the door to those seeking to utilize the 
estate. However, merely enabling a device without addressing the 
presumptions or construction that should be applied when ambiguity 
arises leaves open the question of how best to approach 
interpretational issues when considering stilted or haphazard 
language utilized by drafters. 
Early courts often applied strict interpretation to any language 
used to create joint tenancies. In Butler v. Butler,201 the court surveyed 
the then-existing judicial sentiment of the late 1800s concluding “it is 
established by an overwhelming and unanimous mass of authorities, 
that such estates are not to be favored, and that courts are ‘to exercise 
their ingenuity against them.’ ”202 Since that time, courts have slowly 
evolved in considering the construction to apply in the event of 
ambiguity in an instrument purporting to create a joint tenancy.203 
Modern judicial analysis generally begins by recognizing that most 
legislative policies require resolving any drafting ambiguity in favor of 
 
 199. E.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 335 A.2d 157, 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
 200. MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117.  
 201. 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 96 (1882). 
 202. Id. at 100 (citing Chew v. Chew, 1 Md. 163, 171 (1851) (“On the contrary this 
court is imperatively required by a long course of judicial decisions in this State and 
elsewhere, sustained by every dictate of reason, justice and humanity, to view with 
disfavor, estates in joint tenancy, and to give the widest and most liberal construction to 
testamentary instruments, in order to defeat them wherever we can.”)); Bambaugh v. 
Bambaugh, 11 Serg. & Rawle 191, 192 (Pa. 1824) (“The inconvenience of joint-tenancy, 
has induced the courts to seize on every expression which indicates an intention to give a 
separate interest to each.”); Evans v. Brittain, 3 Serg. & Rawle 135, 137–38 (Pa. 1817) 
(“For many years past the judicial current has set strong against joint-tenancy, and 
justly . . . .”); Galbraith v. Galbraith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 392, 392 (Pa. 1817) (“Joint tenancy 
is, at this day, so far from being favoured that the Courts think themselves justified in 
exercising their ingenuity against it.”); Martin v. Smith, 5 Binn. 16, 17–18 (Pa. 1812) 
(“[N]othing can be more unnatural than an estate in joint-tenancy. It is with good reason 
therefore that courts of justice have long been disposed to lay hold of slight expressions, in 
order to make a tenancy in common.”). 
 203. See, e.g., James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 673–74 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998). 
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establishing a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy.204 In 
fact, most states have adopted legislative positions in favor of 
construing estates as tenancies in common rather than joint tenancies 
where ambiguity exists.205 However, where the express intent of the 
grantor is clear, then the right to survivorship will be upheld.206 As the 
Supreme Court of Ohio noted, “[i]f, on the other hand, a donor or 
grantor, by the operative words of the gift or grant, clearly expresses 
an intention to give the right of survivorship, such words will not be 
disregarded.”207 
For example, Arkansas’ statute enabling joint tenancies is titled 
“tenants in common” and provides that: 
Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or 
more persons, other than executors and trustees as such, shall 
be in tenancy in common unless expressly declared in the grant 
or devise to be a joint tenancy.208 
Arkansas’ statute favoring tenancies in common typifies most joint 
tenancy statutes by continuing to reflect the early twentieth century 
shift away from a constructional preference in favor of joint tenancies 
to a constructional preference for tenancies in common.209 Notably, 
however, more recent decisions and enactments have witnessed a 
movement toward construing joint tenancies more favorably. Ohio’s 
revised joint tenancy statute provides that “[a]ny deed or will 
containing language that shows a clear intent to create a survivorship 
tenancy shall be liberally construed to do so.”210 Iowa offers the most 
recent legislative example of a state taking a progressive stance on 
favorably construing the joint tenancy estate where revisions to its 
longstanding joint tenancy statute became effective this year. The 
statute states, in part: 
A conveyance of real property to two or more grantees in a 
conveyance instrument in any of the following circumstances 
 
 204. See, e.g., Kipp v. Chips Estate, 732 A.2d 127, 130 (Vt. 1999) (citing Cross v. Cross, 
85 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Mass. 1949); Palmer v. Flint, 161 A.2d 837, 842 (Me. 1960); Gagnon v. 
Pronovost, 71 A.2d 747, 750–51 (N.H. 1949) aff’d on reh’g, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1950) 
(“Although the statute does allow a deed to create a joint tenancy by explicit language, the 
legislative policy requires that we resolve ambiguity in favor of a tenancy in common 
rather than a joint tenancy.”)). 
 205. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.06(d), at 23. 
 206. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7. 
 207. In re Hutchison’s Estate, 166 N.E. 687, 691 (Ohio 1929). 
 208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-603 (2011). 
 209. See, e.g., Erickson v. Erickson, 115 P.2d 172, 175 (Or. 1941) (quoting 3 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. 1445 (1940)). 
 210. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis added). 
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creates a presumption of a joint tenancy with rights of 
survivorship unless a contrary intent is expressed in the 
instrument and subject to subsection 3: 
a. The instrument identifies two or more grantees as married to 
each other at the time the instrument is executed. 
b. The instrument describes the conveyance to the grantees 
with the phrase “joint tenants,” “joint tenancy,” or words of 
similar import. 
c. The instrument describes the conveyance to the grantees with 
the phrase “or their survivor” with reference to the grantees, or 
words of similar import.211 
Iowa’s progressive stance exemplifies the modern trend toward 
embracing joint tenancies where the intent of the transferor is clear. 
By modifying the statutory presumption in favor of joint tenancies to 
more closely reflect the intent of parties expressly creating these 
estates, the Iowa statute offers appropriate assurance to those 
utilizing joint tenancies for an array of individual purposes and serves 
as a model for modern construction practices.212 
2.  Creating Joint Tenancies: What’s the Magic Word? 
Absent progressive legislative or judicially recognized 
presumptions in favor of joint tenancies, avoiding ambiguities in the 
terminology employed to create a joint tenancy becomes all the more 
important. At common law, the four unities of time, title, interest, and 
possession defined joint tenancies and their creation.213 With the 
convergence of these four unities, the joint tenancy estate was 
established without any need for special or technical words to give it 
life.214 Now that common law joint tenancies have been abrogated 
throughout the states, creating joint tenancies is entirely dependent 
on employing language that sufficiently demonstrates a manifest 
 
 211. Act of Apr. 3, 2014, ch. 1054, 2014 Iowa Acts 128 (to be codified at IOWA CODE 
§ 557.15 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 212. Notably, the Iowa Supreme Court has also taken a progressive stance on 
approaching creation and severance issues by casting aside all unities based analysis in 
favor of a pure intent approach to joint tenancies. See In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 
493, 497–98 (Iowa 2007). 
 213. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[2], at 51-3. 
 214. Hannah v. Towers, 3 H. & J. 147, 149 (Md. 1810) (finding no need for technical or 
other words to confer a joint tenancy at common law); Holohan v. Melville, 249 P.2d 777, 
782 (Wash. 1952) (en banc) (“Joint tenancy, distinguished by its grand incident of 
survivorship, was a favorite of the common law and no special words or limitations were 
necessary to call it into being.”). 
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intent to establish the estate.215 Thus, where technical or other words 
were once unnecessary to establish a right of survivorship in 
concurrently held property, they very much are required today.216 The 
primary question then becomes: “What are the magic words 
necessary to create a joint tenancy?”217 The answer greatly depends 
on the words chosen and the state where the estate is being created. 
Statutes that go no further than to say that a joint tenancy may 
be created by express terms are the least helpful to solicitors and 
scriveners alike. Unfortunately, most statutes addressing joint 
tenancies are noticeably silent on the words that may be considered 
sufficient to create them. This silence is not surprising given the 
historic context in which most of these statutes were passed. At the 
time, the purpose of most state enactments addressing joint tenancies 
was to abrogate the common law rule concerning the creation of joint 
tenancies and to adopt a construction in favor of tenancies in 
common.218 As originally conceived, joint tenancy statutes were not 
designed to assist courts, practitioners, or parties in creating the very 
estate being abrogated. It is little wonder then that most statutes fail 
to offer any drafting guidance for creating joint tenancies. 
a) And By That You Meant What Exactly? 
Without legislative guidance, courts have turned to the difficult 
task of balancing the intent of the parties against presumptions in 
favor of tenancies in common when construing language purporting 
to create joint tenancies.219 The use of “jointly”220 or “jointly and 
severally”221 has been held insufficient to create a joint tenancy as has 
“share and share alike, or to the survivor.”222 A grant “unto the 
survivor of them”223 has been considered a sufficient expression of 
 
 215. See 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See, e.g., Palmer v. Flint, 161 A.2d 837, 841–42 (Me. 1960). 
 219. See, e.g., Kipp v. Chips Estate, 732 A.2d 127, 130 (Vt. 1999). 
 220. See, e.g., Mustain v. Gardner, 67 N.E. 779, 780 (Ill. 1903); Taylor v. Taylor, 17 
N.W.2d 745, 748–49 (Mich. 1945) (“[T]he mere use of the word ‘jointly’ in the introductory 
paragraph of a deed, with nothing in the granting or habendum clauses to indicate a joint 
tenancy, ‘is not by itself a sufficient declaration of an intent to create an estate in joint 
tenancy to overcome the statutory presumption.’ ”); Overheiser v. Lackey, 100 N.E. 738, 
740 (N.Y. 1913). But see WIS. STAT. § 700.19 (2001) (“Any of the following constitute an 
expression of intent to create a joint tenancy: ‘as joint tenants’, ‘as joint owners’, 
‘jointly’ . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 221. See, e.g., James v. Taylor, 969 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); In re 
Kwatkowski’s Estate, 29 P.2d 639, 640 (Colo. 1934). 
 222. Cross v. Cross, 85 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Mass. 1949). 
 223. Gardner v. Gardner, 335 A.2d 157, 160–61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
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intent to create a joint tenancy, whereas use of the phrase “and to the 
survivors of them” has not.224 
Conveyances to individuals “as tenants by the entireties” who 
are not spouses have generated significant questions for courts 
concerning the nature of the estate intended.225 The predominate 
attribute shared by joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety is the 
right of survivorship in property.226 As a result, courts appropriately 
focused on construing the intent of the parties have found that 
ineffective attempts to create tenancies by the entirety establish joint 
tenancies nonetheless.227 These have included tenants by the entirety 
conveyances to brothers,228 mothers and daughters,229 unmarried 
individuals,230 and persons in bigamous231 or incestuous void 
marriages.232 However, the conclusion that an ineffective attempt to 
create a tenancy by the entirety sufficiently demonstrates intent to 
create a joint tenancy has not been universal. Courts that strictly 
guard tenancies by the entirety as only allowable between spouses 
have refused to construe its misapplication as an expression of intent 
to create a joint tenancy.233 
For courts in Massachusetts, this issue is quickly resolved by 
referring to its joint estates statute that provides: “A conveyance or 
devise of land to two persons as tenants by the entirety, who are not 
married to each other, shall create an estate in joint tenancy and not a 
tenancy in common.”234 
 
 224. Gagnon v. Pronovost, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1949) (holding the use of such 
phrase “too sketchy and speculative to comply with the statutory requirement of a clear 
expression to create a joint tenancy”), aff’d on reh’g, 71 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1950). 
 225. See, e.g., Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (considering the 
creation of a tenancy between unmarried individuals and holding that the court is not 
excused “from the duty of determining and effecting the intention of the grantor as it 
appears on the face of the conveyance”). 
 226. See, e.g., id. at 102 (“Survivorship, the salient feature of joint tenancy, is also 
perhaps the most important feature of tenancy by the entireties . . . .”); Pa. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Thompson, 247 A.2d 771, 771–72 (Pa. 1968) (“[A] joint tenancy best fulfills an 
intent to create a tenancy by the entireties because both contain the survivorship 
feature.”). 
 227. See supra notes 206–10. 
 228. Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 247 A.2d at 773–74. 
 229. Powers v. Buckowitz, 347 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo. 1961) (en banc). 
 230. Coleman, 286 F.2d at 103. 
 231. Wood v. Wood, 571 S.W.2d 84, 85–86 (Ark. 1978). 
 232. In re Estate of Everhart, 783 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010). 
 233. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kappler, 341 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Mich. 1983) (per curiam) 
(“The addition of the language ‘as tenants by the entireties’ was not an express declaration 
of joint tenancy.”). 
 234. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added). 
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Massachusetts’ statute is commendable. It offers courts, 
practitioners, and title abstractors clear guidance on how to interpret 
the intent behind occasional misuse of tenants by the entirety 
language by non-spouses.235 Maine and Utah are the only other states 
to also offer statutory embrace of the misapplication of tenants by the 
entirety.236 In fact, most states fail to offer guidance on this and the 
panoply of other more routine methods that may be acceptable for 
creating joint tenancies. 
b) Creating Certainty: Words and Phrases Blessed by Statute 
Statutes that clarify the method for creating joint tenancies 
obviate interpretational issues that inevitably arise from inartful 
drafting. And a few statutes are worth mentioning because of the 
clarity or confusion they offer to courts and drafters alike. Colorado’s 
joint tenancy statute offers statutory guidance for crafting joint 
tenancies by christening use of the phrase “in joint tenancy,” “as joint 
tenants,” “as joint tenants with rights of survivorship,” or “in joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship,” and specifying that the 
abbreviation “JTWROS” has the same meaning.237 Consequently, 
courts in Colorado apply a simple test when construing instruments 
purporting to create joint tenancies: Instruments that lack statutorily 
prescribed language will not create joint tenancies.238 Even more 
noteworthy is Maine’s joint tenancy statute that offers both a 
construction in favor of joint tenancies and suggestive language for 
creating the estate.239 Under the Maine statute, three different 
methods are recognized for creating joint tenancies: 
Deeds in which 2 or more grantees anywhere in the 
conveyances are named as joint tenants or named as having the 
right of survivorship or that otherwise indicate anywhere in the 
conveyances by appropriate language the intent to create a 
joint tenancy between such grantees must be construed as 
vesting an estate in fee simple in such grantees with right of 
survivorship.240 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 159 (2012); UTAH CODE § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 237. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012). 
 238. Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 964 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (citing In re 
Kwatkowski’s Estate, 29 P.2d 639, 640 (Colo. 1934)). 
 239. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 159. 
 240. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Maine’s joint tenancy statue then goes on to offer perspicuous 
guidance to drafters and courts by specifying the phrases that may be 
used with assurance when creating joint tenancies when it says: 
A conveyance of real property by the owner of the real 
property to the owner and another or others, or by the owners 
of the real property to the owners or to the owners and another 
or others, as joint tenants or with the right of survivorship, or 
that otherwise indicates anywhere in the conveyance by 
appropriate language the intent to create a joint tenancy 
between such owner or owners and such other or others or 
between the owners by the conveyance, including language 
such as “as joint tenants,” “in joint tenancy,” “as joint tenants 
with rights of survivorship,” “with rights of survivorship,” “to 
them and to the survivor of them,” “to them and their assigns 
and to the survivor and the heirs and assigns of the survivor 
forever” or “as tenants by the entirety” creates an estate in joint 
tenancy . . . .241 
The Colorado and Maine statutes reflect a commendable, 
modern approach to addressing creation issues in joint tenancies. 
Statutes that leave open interpretational questions only serve to 
create confusion and litigation. Neither is necessary given the clear 
guidelines that comprehensive drafting can accomplish. 
Unfortunately, all too many statutes are silent on acceptable methods 
for creating joint tenancies. Worse still are statutes like North 
Carolina’s that create potential litigation traps for those fully 
intending and expecting to create a joint tenancy estate. 
c) Word Choice Traps for the Unsuspecting 
The hallmark characteristic of the joint tenancy estate is the right 
of survivorship.242 It is this salient characteristic that both defines the 
joint tenancy estate and uniquely distinguishes it from tenancies in 
common.243 Consequently, because survivorship necessarily defines 
the joint tenancy estate, saying either “joint tenants” or “joint tenants 
with rights of survivorship” says the same thing. A joint tenancy by its 
nature includes the right of survivorship and any addition of “with 
rights of survivorship” is merely superfluous. Courts have routinely 
concluded that conveyances or devises to individuals as “joint 
tenants” are sufficient to establish a joint tenancy without the need 
 
 241. Id. (emphasis added). 
 242. See, e.g., Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 243. Canterbury, 92 P.3d at 964; 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.01[1], at 51-3. 
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for any additional language.244 Statutes in Colorado,245 Connecticut,246 
Georgia,247 Iowa,248 Kansas,249 Maine,250 Massachusetts,251 New 
Mexico,252 Utah,253 and Wisconsin254 all confirm that conveyances to 
grantees “as joint tenants” alone creates a joint tenancy estate. Thus, 
although harmless, the use of “with rights of survivorship” is mere 
surplus when added to “as joint tenants”—at least in most states. 
Notwithstanding the very nature of joint tenancies or the 
construction applied in other state courts and legislatures, the 
Oregon, Virginia, and North Carolina joint tenancy statutes create 
potentially dangerous traps for lawyers and laypersons who transfer 
property to grantees “as joint tenants.” In Oregon and Virginia, a 
conveyance to two or more persons “as joint tenants” will not create a 
joint tenancy unless the specific addition of “with survivorship” is 
included in the instrument.255 Incredibly, at least in Virginia, further 
specifying that the property is not to be held as tenants in common 
will not suffice. In a decision that can only be harmonized by fervent 
distaste for the joint tenancy estate, in Hoover v. Smith,256 the 
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that a conveyance to grantees 
 
 244. See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208, 212 (Md. 1992) (“[W]e believe that 
when a deed uses the words ‘joint tenants,’ as does the instrument in the instant case, this 
language can be sufficient to establish that the property granted is to be held in joint 
tenancy.”); Barrett v. Barrett, 34 A.2d 579, 588 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“I think the addition of 
the words ‘or their heirs and assigns’ did not in any wise indicate an intent to create any 
estate other than that which testator called it, a ‘joint tenancy,’ and if this is so, the added 
phrase may be discarded as mere surplusage.”); Coudert v. Earl, 18 A. 220, 221 (N.J. Ch. 
1889) (“The use of the words ‘and not as tenants in common’ adds nothing to the sense of 
the others, and is mere tautology and surplusage.”); Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 859 
(Tex. 2009) (“A ‘joint tenancy’ or ‘JT TEN’ designation on an account is sufficient to 
create rights of survivorship in community property . . . .”). 
 245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012). 
 246. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-14a (2012). 
 247. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-190 (2010). 
 248. IOWA CODE § 557.15 (2012). 
 249. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (2005). 
 250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 159 (2012). 
 251. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 252. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-16 (West 2012). 
 253. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 254. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.19 (West 2001). 
 255. OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007) (“[J]oint tenancy in real property is abolished and 
the use in a conveyance or devise of the words ‘joint tenants’ or similar words without any 
other indication of an intent to create a right of survivorship creates a tenancy in 
common.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (2012) (“When any person causes any real or 
personal property . . . to be titled, registered, or endorsed in the name of two or more 
persons ‘jointly,’ as ‘joint tenants’ in a ‘joint tenancy,’ or other similar language, such 
persons shall own the property in a joint tenancy without survivorship as provided in § 55-
20.”). 
 256. 444 S.E.2d 546 (Va. 1994). 
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“as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common” failed to express 
sufficient intent to create a joint tenancy.257 The court deemed this 
language “uncertain” and “insufficient, as a matter of law, to create a 
survivorship estate.”258 According to the court, “[t]here still does exist 
such an estate as a joint tenancy without survivorship,” which created 
uncertainty because the parties may have intended such an estate.259 
The court offered no support or citation in claiming that there are 
estates in joint tenancy without survivorship and we can find none.260 
For practitioners and parties in Virginia, the message is loud and 
clear: An explicit reference to “survivorship” must be included in a 
conveyance or devise, or the joint tenancy attempted will fail. 
Although not as explicit as Oregon and Virginia, North 
Carolina’s convoluted joint tenancy statute offers a similar trap for 
the unwary by suggesting that a conveyance or devise must include a 
reference to survivorship when it says that a joint tenancy may be 
created “if the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly 
provides for a right of survivorship.”261 Given that the principal 
incident of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, a North 
Carolina instrument that conveyed property to grantees “as joint 
tenants” would, by the nature of the joint tenancy estate, provide for 
a right of survivorship. Unfortunately, if the statute remains 
unrefined, only litigation and subsequent interpretation will serve to 
confirm this analysis. Thus, it would seem that in Virginia and North 
Carolina, the surest method for creating a joint tenancy by express 
terms would be a conveyance or devise to two or more “as joint 
tenants with rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.”262 
B. Terminating Joint Tenancies: Intent and Transparency 
The right of survivorship incident to the joint tenancy estate is 
more than a mere consequence or casual attribute; it is the essential 
and defining feature associated with this unique estate.263 In fact, it is 
 
 257. Id. at 546, 548. 
 258. Id. at 548. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. To the contrary, the principal and defining characteristic of a joint tenancy is 
the jus accrescendi, or right of survivorship. See supra text accompanying note 242. 
 261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 262. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-7-40 (2007) (“[W]henever any deed of conveyance of 
real estate contains the names of the grantees followed by the words ‘as joint tenants with 
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common’ the creation of a joint tenancy with 
rights of survivorship in the real estate is conclusively deemed to have been created.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 263. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.02[1], at 51-7. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
2015] JOINT TENANCY IN NORTH CAROLINA. 1703 
this survivorship feature that “satisfies some near-permanent societal 
demand,” as illustrated by its popular usage in today’s culture.264 Yet 
jurisprudentially, the “right” of survivorship is less of a right and more 
akin to a mere hope.265 In truth, the moniker “right of survivorship” is 
a legal misnomer that has perpetuated for several centuries.266 A joint 
tenant merely holds an expectancy to prevail in the survival battle 
with her fellow joint tenants.267 She maintains no vested right in the 
survivorship feature appurtenant to the estate given that it is always 
subject to termination while other tenants are living.268 Yet, like 
creation, the question becomes how and by what methods 
termination may be effectuated. This question has plagued property 
law for several centuries and today modern legislatures and courts 
continue to grapple with how severance issues should be construed 
and the methods by which terminating a joint tenancy should be 
effectuated.269 
While few modern state statutes offer guidance on creating joint 
tenancies, fewer still suggest any mechanism for destroying the estate 
once established. As the New Mexico Supreme Court recently 
conceded, “[o]ur statutes, while voluble on the subject of creating a 
joint tenancy, are silent as to its termination.”270 Unfortunately, this 
statutory silence is the norm. As a consequence, the typical analysis 
applied to joint tenancy termination issues all too often remains 
marred in an ancient four-unities based construction.271 Some modern 
courts have become increasingly frustrated with the inflexibility of a 
strict four-unities analysis and have begun augmenting it with 
additional methods by which termination may be effectuated. Under 
this augmented analysis, joint tenancies may be terminated by 
destruction of one or more of the four unities, mutual agreement, or 
 
 264. Orth, supra note 175, at 180 (describing modern usage of the estate in joint 
financial accounts, for avoiding probate expenses, as a will substitute, and among 
unmarried couples); see supra text accompanying notes 184–88; see also Helmholz, supra 
note 9, at 4 (explaining that despite presumptions favoring tenancies-in-common, joint 
tenancies are frequently used and appear to be growing in popularity). 
 265. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16.1 (“The survivorship right is not a 
property interest, but is a mere expectancy incident to joint tenancy ownership—a mere 
gamble that the holder of the survivorship right will survive the other joint tenants without 
severance of the joint tenancy.”). 
 266. See Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 965 (Colo. 2004). 
 267. See id.; see also Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 268. See Canterbury, 92 P.3d at 965. 
 269. See Helmholz, supra note 9, at 6. 
 270. Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 663 (N.M. 2012). 
 271. See Helmholz, supra note 9, at 6. 
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inference implied by the course of conduct between joint tenants.272 
Meanwhile other courts have made the appropriate decision to adopt 
a purely intent-based analysis rather than trying to tinker with an 
outmoded system. Most notably, the Iowa Supreme Court recently 
cast aside entirely a unities-based analysis in favor of construing the 
intent of the parties for all purposes, whether creation or 
destruction.273 
Unfortunately, many modern interpretational questions 
concerning termination remain strictly tied to a formalistic, unities-
based analysis that ignores the clear intent and purposes of the 
parties.274 As a consequence, the need for legislative guidance that 
focuses on objective manifestations of express intent is as important 
in the termination context as it is in the creation. As Professor 
Helmholz noted in his review of realism and formalism in joint 
tenancies, “[h]appy are the courts of states where the legislature has 
created a statutory presumption for determining severance questions, 
or at least set some exact requirements for severing a joint 
tenancy.”275 Having previously addressed the many issues joint 
tenants encounter in creating joint tenancies, we focus now on 
severance issues in the context of collective and unilateral actions 
taken by joint tenants with a special emphasis on model statutes 
offering guidance in fairly and efficiently terminating joint tenancies. 
1.  Collective Termination by All Joint Tenants 
An ongoing question that has preoccupied courts and 
practitioners in the severance context is whether an instrument 
executed by all joint tenants operates as a conversion of the joint 
tenancy into a tenancy in common.276 A conveyance strictly between 
joint tenants terminates the estate with respect to the interest 
conveyed, either in part or in whole.277 And deeds executed by all 
 
 272. See, e.g., Edwin Smith, L.L.C., 285 P.3d at 663 (noting these three methods of 
terminating a joint tenancy). 
 273. See In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 2007). 
 274. See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed, 220 N.C. App. 504, 510, 725 
S.E.2d 667, 671 (2012); Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 P.3d 984, 996 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) 
(concluding that a joint tenancy had been severed at its inception “[d]espite the parties’ 
clear specification that they took the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship”). 
 275. Helmholz, supra note 9, at 25 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,109 (2009)). 
 276. See, e.g., Ball v. Mann, 199 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Buford v. 
Dahlke, 62 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Neb. 1954); Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 475. 
 277. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(a). 
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joint tenants to third parties plainly destroy the joint tenancy estate.278 
However, transfers of lesser interests are not as clear.279 For example, 
where A, B, and C enter into a contract to sell property held by the 
three of them as joint tenants, does the mere execution of the contract 
sever the joint tenancy? 
Under the accepted common law theory of equitable conversion, 
an executory contract for the sale of real property effectively splits 
legal and equitable title such that equitable title inures to the buyer, 
whereas bare legal title remains with the seller as security for 
payment of the purchase price.280 Some courts have reasoned that the 
equitable division of title with a third party operates as a severance of 
the joint tenancy estate.281 According to this analysis, a joint tenancy 
is destroyed at the moment an agreement to sell is signed. The fact 
that an agreement is wholly silent on survivorship is inconsequential. 
The intent of the parties or the subsequent termination of the 
contract plays no role in the analysis.282 This hyper-formalistic 
approach has been criticized before,283 and some courts have 
appropriately refused to join in similar reasoning.284 We agree. An 
analysis that blindly couples a legal fiction with an outmoded unities 
construction unnecessarily delivers a severance result that ignores the 
intent of the parties. 
However, it is not always clear whether instruments signed by all 
joint tenants sever the joint estate, even when using an intent-based 
analysis. The parties may not express their intent to maintain or 
terminate their survivorship rights in the contracts, leases, and others 
documents they collectively execute. As a consequence, some courts 
have turned to amorphous considerations of whether the acts of the 
 
 278. See, e.g., Ball, 199 P.2d at 708; Register of Wills for Montgomery Cnty. v. Madine, 
219 A.2d 245, 247 (Md. 1966) (“We think there can be little doubt that a conveyance of the 
legal title by all the joint tenants destroys the joint tenancy in the property conveyed.”). 
 279. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1][b], at 51-20. 
 280. Id. § 81.03[1], at 81-82 to -83. 
 281. See, e.g., Buford, 62 N.W.2d at 255–56 (“It logically follows from what has been 
said that if all the joint tenants enter into a joint contract to sell the joint property, receive 
and accept a part of the purchase price, and put the purchaser in possession of the 
property, this destroys the joint tenancy in the realty, even though the vendor retains legal 
title to the realty as security for the balance of the purchase price.”). 
 282. See generally Hughes v. De Barberi, 107 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Neb. 1961) (asserting 
that an agreement to sell property per se destroys a joint tenancy without any mention or 
consideration of the intent of the parties). 
 283. See, e.g., Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 476. 
 284. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 126 N.E.2d 220, 224 (Ill. 1955); Simon v. Chartier, 27 
N.W.2d 752, 754 (Wis. 1947). 
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parties as a whole demonstrate a desire to terminate their 
survivorship interest in property held in joint tenancy.285 
The Arizona Supreme Court confronted this issue for the first 
time in deciding In re Estate of Estelle286 when a couple who owned 
property as joint tenants filed for divorce and subsequently entered 
into a comprehensive property settlement agreement.287 The 
settlement agreement included provisions for the eventual sale and 
distribution of the joint tenancy property, but made no mention of the 
survivorship estate in the interim.288 After its execution, but before 
the property was listed for sale, the former husband died.289 His ex-
wife then claimed full survivorship rights in the property maintaining 
that the settlement agreement did not operate as a severance.290 The 
court began by noting that in many jurisdictions “a contract to convey 
operates, in equity, as a severance of the joint tenancy.”291 Yet no 
contract with a third party existed.292 The parties had only agreed 
between themselves that the property would eventually be sold.293 
Nonetheless, the court decided that the joint tenancy had been 
severed.294 The court concluded that the couple’s agreement to divide 
the proceeds of the future sale of the property was “patently 
inconsistent with the continued right of survivorship.”295 As a 
consequence, the court concluded that the parties had severed the 
estate by implication.296 
Legislative guidance and preventive drafting offer better 
solutions to severance issues where joint tenants act in concert. 
Wisconsin and South Dakota both have statutory presumptions in 
favor of maintaining survivorship where all joint tenants contract to 
sell their property, unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.297 
 
 285. See, e.g., Wardlow v. Pozzi, 338 P.2d 564, 565–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 286. 593 P.2d 663 (Ariz. 1979). 
 287. Id. at 664. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 665. 
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. at 664. 
 294. Id. at 667. 
 295. Id. at 666. 
 296. Id. at 667. 
 297. WIS. STAT. § 700.21 (2001); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-26-4 (2004). South Dakota 
also has promulgated title standards applicable to contracts for deeds to property held in 
joint tenancy that favor maintaining the survivorship incident to the property, stating “[a] 
contract for deed for the sale of real property held in joint tenancy does not have the 
effect of dissolving the joint tenancy relationship of the vendors if the contract for deed is 
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In fact, Wisconsin preserves survivorship in the proceeds from the 
purchase price.298 Unfortunately, these statutes appear only to address 
real estate sales contracts and not the litany of other potential issues 
that may arise where all joint tenants join in a transaction—from 
property settlement agreements to leases and liens. Georgia takes a 
broader approach to collective agreements by stating that no 
severance occurs in recorded lifetime transfers signed by all joint 
tenants.299 However, the best model is found in a Nebraska statute 
that offers a clear, straightforward approach to construing the acts of 
all joint tenants without the necessity of relying on a cumbersome 
unities analysis or implied destruction considerations: “There shall be 
no severance of an existing joint tenancy in real estate when all joint 
tenants execute any instrument with respect to the property held in 
joint tenancy, unless the intention to effect a severance expressly 
appears in the instrument.”300   
There are multiple benefits to the Nebraska presumption in 
favor of preserving survivorship. Joint tenants may freely execute 
contracts without worry that they may have to recreate their joint 
tenancy in the event that a deal collapses. They may collectively enter 
into leases, options, rights of first refusal, and other agreements 
without constantly having to reaffirm their intent to maintain the 
property with rights of survivorship. And joint tenants seeking to 
mortgage their interest in the property would not have their 
survivorship rights terminated, irrespective of whether they reside in 
a “lien theory” or “title theory” state. 
Although an intent-based approach to severance is the preferred 
analysis, intent alone cannot always answer questions raised by the 
actions of joint tenants acting in concert. Legislative presumptions 
like those found in Nebraska assure the status quo but are rare 
indeed. Until such presumptions are adopted more broadly, 
preventive lawyering necessitates that practitioners drafting 
documents for joint tenants acting together affirmatively state within 
their instruments whether the transaction is intended to destroy the 
joint tenancy between the parties or is otherwise intended to be 
unaffected. 
 
executed by all the joint tenants, unless otherwise specifically provided in the instrument.” 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-30 tit. standard § 2-06 (2004). 
 298. WIS. STAT. § 700.21. 
 299. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-190 (2010). 
 300. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 109 (2009). 
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2.  Unilateral Termination by Individual Tenants 
The customary rule applied to individual severances by less than 
all joint tenants is generally stated as follows: joint tenants have the 
absolute, unilateral right to terminate a joint tenancy301 and may do so 
at any time without the knowledge or consent of any other tenant.302 
Our discussion supra concerning predictable severance issues 
illustrates how courts have upheld unilateral severances, whether 
intended or not, by tenants conveying, encumbering, partitioning, 
divorcing, mutually agreeing, or even “acting inconsistently” with the 
right of survivorship.303 Some courts have steadfastly maintained a 
unities-based approach to unilateral severances, irrespective of 
intent.304 Others have sought a middle ground that augments a unities 
analysis with additional severance considerations involving course of 
conduct and mutual agreements.305 Still others have shuttered unities 
entirely by adopting a purely intent-based approach to severance 
issues by joint tenants acting alone.306 
A recurring theme with unilateral acts that terminate a joint 
tenant’s right to survivorship concerns the method by which an act 
may be deemed sufficient to sever and the notice, consent, or 
knowledge that is deserving of fellow joint tenants. We begin by 
considering the opposing ends of the spectrum between indestructible 
joint tenancies and those terminable by stealth actions of a single 
tenant without the knowledge, notice, or consent of the other passive 
joint tenants. Standing in-between these poles we see the opportunity 
for a reasoned approach to severance that embraces the unilateral 
right of any joint tenant to sever the survivorship feature associated 
with her interest, while offering objective severance standards and 
reasonable notice to her fellow tenants. As we will demonstrate, 
transparency and fair dealings in the joint tenancy context are best 
promoted through statutory language that demands public recording 
 
 301. 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16 to 16.1. 
 302. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hoffman, 653 N.W.2d 94, 98 (S.D. 2002). 
 303. See discussion supra at Section I.C.2. 
 304. See, e.g., Helinski v. Harford Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 831 A.2d 40, 46 (Md. 2003); In re 
Estate of Potthoff, 733 N.W.2d 860, 867–68 (Neb. 2007). 
 305. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 225 (Kan. 2004) (holding additional 
severance considerations should be included in severance analysis, but “intent alone will 
not sever the joint tenancy”). 
 306. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 2007) (formally and 
expressly adopting an intent-based approach); In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 
969, 976 (Utah 1996) (finding substantial support for the concept that severance should be 
governed by the intent of the parties rather than destruction of the four unities). 
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and actual notice to all other tenants of any instrument that 
terminates an interest in the joint tenancy estate. 
a) Indestructible Estates: Thou Shalt Not Sever 
At one end of the concurrent ownership spectrum are 
indestructible estates that may not be severed by individual tenants. 
As a general rule, unlike tenancies by the entirety, joint tenancies are 
not characterized by inseverability.307 Of course, parties may always 
convey interests in property as joint life estates with cross-contingent 
remainders as a method of insuring the inseverability of the 
survivorship feature.308 But those estates are vested interests distinctly 
separate and apart from joint tenancies. Nonetheless, some courts 
have recognized unique forms of joint tenancy estates that are 
inseverable.309 
Michigan, for example, has long acknowledged a special form of 
joint tenancy that is indestructible. In Albro v. Allen,310 the Michigan 
Supreme Court first recognized two types of joint tenancies: ordinary 
joint tenancies and indestructible joint tenancies.311 In that state, 
granting instruments that include express words of survivorship create 
a joint estate characterized by joint life estates with contingent 
remainders.312 These contingent remainders are vested survivorship 
rights that are indestructible.313 In states that have abolished joint 
tenancies, other courts have recognized similar life estates with vested 
cross-contingent survivorship remainders that create indestructible 
survivorships when a joint tenancy is attempted.314 Some courts have 
even endorsed a “tenants in common with rights of survivorship” 
estate with similar indestructible, vested, cross-contingent 
survivorship features in remainder.315 Likewise, Oregon mandates by 
statute that “[a] declaration of a right to survivorship creates a 
 
 307. See 7 POWELL, supra note 79, § 51.04[1], at 51-16. Certainly, there are mechanisms 
that may be used to exercise more stringent control over property ownership, including 
trusts, corporate entities, and other methods beyond the scope of this article. 
 308. See Swenson & Degnan, supra note 9, at 469. 
 309. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Ky. 1992); Jackson v. Estate of 
Green, 771 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Mich. 2009); Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Mich. 1990); 
Brown v. Brown, 706 N.E.2d 872, 874 (Ohio 1998). 
 310. 454 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 1990). 
 311. Id. at 88. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See, e.g., Hilterbrand v. Carter, 27 P.3d 1086, 1089 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 
Halleck v. Halleck, 337 P.2d 330, 338 (Or. 1959)). 
 315. See, e.g., Durant v. Hamrick, 409 So. 2d 731, 736 (Ala. 1981); Smith v. Cutler, 623 
S.E.2d 644, 646–47 (S.C. 2005). 
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tenancy in common in the life estate with cross contingent remainders 
in the fee simple.”316 Ironically, Oregon’s statute creates an even more 
rigid estate than the joint tenancy it abolishes.317 
Most notably, the Ohio legislature has adopted an indestructible 
joint-tenancy-type estate its calls a “survivorship tenancy.”318 This 
special estate has the essential features of a concurrent estate held in 
joint tenancy but is significantly distinguished by its indestructibility: 
A conveyance from any survivorship tenant, or from any 
number of survivorship tenants that is from less than all of 
them, to a person who is not a survivorship tenant vests the title 
of the grantor or grantors in the grantee, conditioned on the 
survivorship of the grantor or grantors of the conveyance, and 
does not alter the interest in the title of any of the other 
survivorship tenants who do not join in the conveyance.319 
In construing this “survivorship tenancy” statute, the Ohio court in 
Brown v. Brown320 noted that the “clear purpose of these statutes is to 
ensure that title vests in the surviving joint tenant or tenants at the 
time of death.”321 
Thus, at one end of the spectrum we see survivorship estates and 
quasi-joint tenancies with inseverable qualities offering no 
opportunity for individual severance of the survivorship feature.322 As 
much as these estates preserve and guarantee survivorship rights, they 
eviscerate the unique flexibility commonly associated with joint 
tenancies and serve to frustrate the intent of parties who are no 
longer desirous of maintaining the joint tenancy relationship.323 
b) Termination At-Will, Transparency at Risk 
At the other end of the spectrum are traditional joint tenancy 
estates that are severable at-will by any joint tenant without regard to 
 
 316. OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007). 
 317. See id. 
 318. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 319. Id. § 5302.20(C)(2) (emphasis added). 
 320. 706 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1998). 
 321. Id. at 873.  
 322. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (2007). 
 323. See generally Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. 1990) (holding that when a 
seller of a one-half interest in a joint tenancy entered into a purchase agreement to convey 
her interest to a buyer, the interest conveyed to the seller and the other cotenant was a 
joint life estate with indestructible dual contingent remainder).  
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transparency.324 Within these estates an individual joint tenant may 
elect to terminate her survivorship interest without the knowledge, 
consent, or notice to any other tenant. Undoubtedly, one of the 
associated hazards with using the traditional joint tenancy estate is 
the right of an individual tenant to effectuate a termination, thereby 
destroying the right of survivorship.325 Because the survivorship 
incident to the estate is not vested, any single tenant may decide to 
convert her interest into a tenancy in common at any time. However, 
the common hazard associated with unilateral termination becomes 
exacerbated by rules enabling or encouraging stealth severances by 
joint tenants who want to have their cake and eat it, too. How does 
the stealth severance operate? At the risk of perpetuating fraud, like 
so: An unscrupulous joint tenant makes a secret conveyance of his 
joint tenancy interest and places it in a secure place where it will be 
discovered upon his death. He then waits. If his unsuspecting fellow 
tenant dies first, he destroys the secret severance instrument and 
claims ownership of the entire property. If he dies first, he is secure in 
knowing his interest will pass to his heirs. In this heads I win, tails you 
lose scenario the unsuspecting tenant loses either way. 
The stealth severance problem begins with courts that staunchly 
adhere to the notion that a joint tenant may sever without the consent 
or notice of the other tenants.326 This “power” of a joint tenant to 
convey her interest in a joint tenancy without the knowledge or 
consent of other tenants has even been described as an “indisputable 
right.”327 Courts have parroted this sentiment for decades and some 
legislatures have adopted similar positions.328 In New York, the rule is 
crystal clear by statute: “In addition to any other means by which a 
joint tenancy with right of survivorship may be severed, a joint tenant 
may unilaterally sever a joint tenancy in real property without consent 
 
 324. See, e.g., Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
the quitclaim deed by which deceased spouse had conveyed her interest in property to her 
son was valid and, thus, terminated the joint tenancy). 
 325. See Samuel M. Fetters, An Invitation to Commit Fraud: Secret Destruction of Joint 
Tenant Survivorship Rights, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 175 (1986); Swenson & Degnan, 
supra note 9, at 469. 
 326. See, e.g., Smolen v. Smolen, 956 P.2d 128, 130 (Nev. 1998); In re Estate of 
Hoffman, 653 N.W.2d 94, 98 (N.D. 2002); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 327. E.g., Sathoff v. Sutterer, 869 N.E.2d 354, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 328. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-b 
(McKinney 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.010 (West 2013); Burke v. Stevens, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Johnson v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Ill., Inc., 506 
N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d 219, 222 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
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of any non-severing joint tenant or tenants . . . .”329 California’s joint 
tenancy statute is nearly verbatim, providing that a joint tenant may 
sever without the joinder or consent of any other tenant.330 
A growing movement permitting joint tenants to sever their 
interest in a joint tenancy by self-conveyance further enhances the 
hazard associated with stealth termination.331 At common law, a 
conveyance from an individual as grantor to herself as grantee had no 
legal effect on destroying any of the four unities, and therefore could 
not effectuate a severance.332 Under a unities approach, a self-
conveyance from the same grantor “as joint tenant” to the same 
grantee “as tenant in common” was impossible.333 As a consequence, 
a joint tenant who wanted to effectively sever her interest in a joint 
tenancy would grant her interest in the property to a third-party 
straw-person who would then immediately convey the property back 
to the severing joint tenant.334 Courts have found this process 
unnecessarily formalistic, and legislatures have agreed. This circuitous 
process has been largely eliminated for creating joint tenancies and is 
equally being scuttled in the severance context. Many modern courts 
and legislatures deride this tortuous process and have eschewed its 
requirement in the severance context.335 Nebraska’s joint tenancy 
statute explicitly rejects this formalistic unities requirement by stating: 
“the conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or 
herself as grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the 
joint tenancy expressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint 
tenancy.”336 As the Utah Supreme Court cautioned in In re Estate of 
Knickerbocker,337 when endorsing severance by self-conveyance, “an 
unrecorded and unwitnessed unilateral transaction may allow one 
 
 329. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney 1998) (emphasis added).  
 330. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 2015). 
 331. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(b), at 60. 
 332. See, e.g., In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 1996). 
 333. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 176, § 31.08(b), at 60. 
 334. Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 966–67 (Colo. 2004). 
 335. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 311 
(2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 159 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-118 (2009); N.Y. 
REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 
2012); Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Canterbury, 92 P.3d 
at 967; Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); In re 
Estate of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (Iowa 2007); Reicherter v. McCauley, 283 P.3d 
219, 222 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Johnson v. MacIntyre, 740 A.2d 599, 609 (Md. 1999); 
Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Minn. 1968); 
Edwin Smith, L.L.C. v. Synergy Operating, L.L.C., 285 P.3d 656, 664 (N.M. 2012); In re 
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 974–75. 
 336. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-118.  
 337. 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996). 
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joint tenant to defraud the other.”338 Undoubtedly that is true. And it 
is no wonder why the Utah legislature subsequently amended its joint 
tenancy statute to provide that self-conveyances must be “bona fide” 
to effectuate a severance.339 The logic in permitting self-conveyances 
over formalistic straw-person conveyances is sound and one we 
endorse, but not without additional protections for other tenants. 
Those protections begin with demanding that instruments purporting 
to terminate a joint tenancy be recorded in order to be effective. 
c) Effectuating Severance: Intent + Recording 
Statutes and judicial opinions that sanctify self-conveyances 
exacerbate the potential for stealth termination. Unfortunately, self-
conveyances are not the only mechanism available to deceive fellow 
tenants. A defrauding tenant may execute multiple deeds through a 
straw-person and then later dispose of them,340 or a joint tenant may 
convey her interest directly to her preferred heir with specific wait-
and-see instructions.341 The common strategy in each of these schemes 
is for the severance instrument to remain unrecorded so that it may 
be later suppressed if the passive, non-severing tenant should die first. 
All of these schemes are easily remedied by statute. 
A few states have addressed stealth termination by making 
severance of an individual share in a joint tenancy effective only after 
an instrument indicating an intent to sever has been publically 
recorded.342 These states are notable both for inhibiting stealth 
severances and the guidance they provide to the bench and bar.343 For 
example, Colorado’s joint tenancy statute establishes a clear 
mechanism by which a tenant may effectively terminate her interest 
in a joint tenancy via unilateral self-conveyance.344 In that state, “a 
joint tenant may sever the joint tenancy between himself or herself 
and all remaining joint tenants by unilaterally executing and 
recording an instrument conveying her interest in real property to 
 
 338. Id. at 976. The court recognized the inherent fraud associated with unwitnessed 
and unrecorded unilateral transactions whereby one tenant attempts to secretly destroy a 
joint tenancy. However, the court did not have to directly confront the secret severance 
issue because the terminating tenant promptly recorded her self-conveyance. 
 339. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (West 2012). 
 340. See, e.g., Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 972. 
 341. See, e.g., Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 877–78 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 342. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-431 (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 500.19 (2001); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-5 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 343. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-431; CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2; COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-31-101; MINN. STAT. § 500.19; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5. 
 344. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-31-101.  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1649 (2015) 
1714 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
himself or herself as tenant in common.”345 The Colorado approach is 
notable for enabling user-friendly terminations by self-conveyance 
instruments while prohibiting secret, wait-and-see schemes. Mere 
execution of the self-conveyance instrument alone is insufficient to 
effectuate a termination of the joint tenancy.346 The scheming joint 
tenant who quietly executes and retains an instrument conveying his 
interest in joint tenancy to himself as a tenant in common is foiled. 
Colorado law demands that severance instruments be recorded and 
directly ties the timing of the severance event to formal recording 
rather than the date of execution by proclaiming that “[t]he joint 
tenancy shall be severed upon recording such instrument.”347 
Minnesota’s joint tenancy statute offers even more comprehensive 
guidance by outlining the specific methods for and legal effectiveness 
of severance: 
Severance of estates in joint tenancy. A severance of a joint 
tenancy interest in real estate by a joint tenant shall be legally 
effective only if (1) the instrument of severance is recorded in 
the office of the county recorder or the registrar of titles in the 
county where the real estate is situated; or (2) the instrument of 
severance is executed by all of the joint tenants; or (3) the 
severance is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (4) 
a severance is effected pursuant to bankruptcy of a joint 
tenant.348 
California goes one step further by prohibiting deathbed 
severances made within three days of the severing tenant’s death.349 
Any individual who takes title from a severing tenant by unrecorded 
instrument merely holds a defeasible tenancy in common that is 
subject to divestment if the nonsevering joint tenant survives the 
severing joint tenant.350 
 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. (emphasis added). One door left slightly open by the Colorado statute 
concerns whether the heirs of a joint tenant who executed a secret severance could still 
record the instrument postmortem and then claim an interest in the property. The plain 
language of the entire statute would appear to foreclose this approach. To be effective, 
unilateral self-conveyances must be executed and recorded. The clear intent of coupling 
these two requirements appears to be aimed at prohibiting wait-and-see schemes. 
Moreover, any relation-back claim would appear to fail because the statute says that 
severance occurs upon recording rather than on the date of the instrument. Finally, 
because the statute declares that death terminates a joint tenant’s interest, a post-mortem 
severance would be ineffective because the deceased tenant has no interest to sever. 
 348. MINN. STAT. § 500.19 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 349. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683.2 (West 2015). 
 350. Id. 
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Thus, unscrupulous tenants in these states must affirmatively 
choose between being equally yoked to the survivorship gamble or 
committing to an immediate severance. The defrauding tenant cannot 
take a wait-and-see approach and expect the post-death discovery of 
his unrecorded severance to be effective. These types of recording 
mandates are commendable for foreclosing fraudulent schemes by 
unscrupulous tenants. What they lack is any requirement for 
transparency in the severance context. Other than those tenants who 
spend their days combing through land records, recording statutes fail 
to promote actual notice among joint tenants, leaving the vast 
majority in the dark. 
d) The Severance High Road: Recording and Actual Notice 
As we have seen, in today’s world, individuals in traditional and 
non-traditional relationships routinely use joint tenancies for asset 
management in an array of contexts.351 The survivorship feature offers 
a will-substitute opportunity that avoids probate and eases transitions 
in property ownership. Another alluring aspect of these estates is that 
they are flexible. Any tenant may opt out of the survivorship feature 
in favor of a tenancy in common.352 And, yet, their terminable nature 
should not be characterized by secrecy or the fear of unilateral 
severances being made unbeknownst to fellow tenants. A joint tenant 
should not be expected to gamble both on survivorship and 
transparency in the relationship. The nature of the relationship itself 
necessitates pellucidity, especially in the context of spouses, and 
courts have recognized that reliance and consideration often play a 
role in the survivorship estate as well as the expectations of the 
parties.353 
A joint tenant who unilaterally severs without providing actual 
notice to her fellow tenants deprives them of the opportunity to plan 
their own disposition of the property both during life and after death. 
A tenant who is informed that she will no longer survive to full 
ownership may no longer desire to continue maintaining, improving, 
and paying taxes on the property. Instead, she may decide to sell what 
 
 351. See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra Section IV.A. 
 353. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 
692 (Minn. 1968) (“If the survivor had taken some irrevocable action in reliance upon the 
creation or existence of the joint tenancy, or if some consideration was given or received 
when the joint tenancy was created, it would seem reasonable to insist that unilateral 
action would not be effective to deprive the passive joint tenant of the rights so created.”). 
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is now a tenancy in common interest or, at a minimum, consider who 
among her heirs should receive her interest in the property. 
On one end of the joint tenancy spectrum stands the inseverable 
joint tenancy whose incident of survivorship cannot be abolished. At 
the other stands the traditional joint tenancy estate that may be 
unilaterally severed by a single tenant at-will without notice or 
consent afforded other tenants. Neither inflexibility nor secrecy is an 
appropriate model for the modern joint tenancy estate. Recording 
statutes that offer constructive knowledge and objective criteria for 
effectuating severance by a single tenant are commendable, but fail to 
recognize that constructive notice is rarely notice at all. Thus, a 
middle-ground and higher road that embraces flexibility and 
transparency is needed—one that couples recording with actual 
notice. 
As the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged, “it is necessary for 
the common law to keep pace with the gradual changes of trade, 
commerce, arts, inventions, and the exigencies and usages of the 
country.”354 Modification of the rules applicable to creation and 
severance of joint tenancies should be no different.355 The model for 
the modern joint tenancy estate is one that may be created or 
terminated only based upon express intent. Modern joint tenancies 
should continue to maintain flexibility through unilateral severability. 
However, in order to impede fraud by unscrupulous tenants, 
severance should be effective only upon the pre-death recording of an 
instrument stating an intent to terminate the survivorship. And, 
finally, because of the nature of the relationship and the ease in which 
notice may be effectuated in the technologically advanced age in 
which we live, severance should not be effective without actual notice 
to all other joint tenants. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus,356 the North 
Carolina joint tenancy with right of survivorship slept sealed in a cave 
for several centuries and awoke to a changed world. Because 
traditional joint tenancy jurisprudence remained dormant until 
1991,357 no North Carolina appellate court decision existed 
 
 354. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 447 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. 1983) (quoting Amann 
v. Eaidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953)). 
 355. See id. 
 356. See, e.g., Catholic Encyclopedia: The Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, NEW ADVENT, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05496a.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 357. See generally Orth, supra note 3 (describing the revision of G.S. 41-2). 
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interpreting joint tenancy law until a mother unintentionally severed 
a newborn joint tenancy by executing a deed of trust and mortgage 
note at a real estate closing without the signatures of her fellow joint 
tenants. 
The lack of an inventory of appellate court decisions in this state 
to inform predictable joint tenancy issues of creation and severance 
presents a refreshing and challenging opportunity for members of the 
practicing bar, judiciary, and General Assembly. In our opinion, the 
opportunity presented requires adopting an intent-based approach to 
both creation and severance. The joint tenancy of this millennium is 
not the Colonial American unwanted vestige of British aristocracy. 
Today, it is a useful, necessary, and flexible form of concurrent 
property ownership for asset management and disposition. 
While the traditional four unities may continue to be present in 
the creation of some joint tenancies, three of the four are no longer 
legal prerequisites. Modern joint tenancies come into being because 
of express intent, not medieval unities requirements of time, title, and 
interest. Likewise, severance should be primarily based on an express 
intent to sever. Condoning accidental, counterintuitive severances 
based on the destruction of archaic “unities” technicalities makes no 
sense, and judicial precedent from other jurisdictions locked in the 
past should be ignored when sufficient intent exists to preserve, not 
terminate, a joint tenancy. The express intent standard required to 
create a joint tenancy should likewise apply to terminating a joint 
tenancy. 
G.S. 41-2(a) should be revised to accommodate any form of 
language intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. 
While use of the precise formula “as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship” is the real property expert’s choice, any word 
combination evincing an intent to hold property as joint tenants 
should be honored. In the absence of clarification by the General 
Assembly, progressive judicial interpretation reflecting modern 
trends and usage should be based on intent, even in the absence 
magic words. 
Severance issues should also be clarified by the General 
Assembly. G.S. 41-2(a1), the legislative reaction to the Countrywide 
decision, is fundamentally flawed. It is practically indecipherable 
when applied to predictable fact situations and, therefore, must be 
reconsidered and clarified. Some easily identifiable severance issues 
related to divorce, partition, or the execution of a contract to convey 
or lease by one or more joint tenants should also be addressed by 
clarifying legislation. The issue of “stealth” severances—allowed 
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under the common law without notice to the other joint tenant or 
joint tenants—should also be addressed by embracing actual notice 
and recording requirements for instruments that specifically include 
language of express intent to sever. 
Finally, there is an important preventive law role to be played by 
practicing attorneys. The inclusion of provisions stating the intent of 
joint tenant parties in contracts to convey, leases, and other 
instruments may go a long way in avoiding later disputes and 
litigation. Attorneys should also be acutely aware of possible 
severance issues in partition and divorce proceedings until legislative 
and judicial guidance is afforded. 
